THE NEW DEMOCRAT

FALL 1998

BLUEPRINT

IDEAS FOR A NEW CENTURY

Volume 1

SEEING THE FUTURE

The Next Politics



Five New Realities

Poll: The Active Center

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

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PUBLISHER
Al From

EDITOR
Andrei Cherny

SENIOR EDITORIAL CONSULTANTS
Donald A. Baer
Elaine C. Kamarck

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Holly Page

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Bloom & Mertz

ART DIRECTOR
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Kate Rader

COVER ILLUSTRATION
Keith W. Bloom

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INTRODUCTION



With this volume, we are inaugurating **Blueprint: Ideas for a New Century**, a public policy journal for the Information Age.

In **Blueprint**, we hope to provide the plans — the ideas and the policies — with which to build the foundation for a new progressive politics. In the months ahead, these pages will be filled with the work of a select group of cutting-edge thinkers. These writers will frame the challenges that America and the world face at this crucial moment in our history. And they will propose bold, innovative, and workable solutions to meet those challenges.

Those solutions will be built on the principles that have always been at the core of the American progressive tradition and the New Democrat movement:

- A commitment to equal opportunity for all and special privileges for none.
- An understanding that economic growth is the prerequisite for opportunity for all, and the private sector, not government, is the primary engine for economic growth. The combination of private sector dynamism and sound economic policies can create conditions for new wealth, greater economic and social investment, and upward mobility for all Americans. Our national economy is not a zero-sum game: Economic growth and social justice can go hand-in-hand.
- A core ideal of community and an ethic of mutual responsibility. We can achieve our individual destinies only if we share a commitment to our national destiny. As the instrument of the community's will, government should create opportunity for all citizens, but every citizen should give something back to the commonwealth.
- A belief that America has a responsibility to lead the world toward greater political and economic freedom by showing that freedom can benefit all nations and can lift standards of living worldwide.
- A dedication to self-government. Government can and should play a positive role in national life, but to do that it should be constantly modernized to cope with the fast-paced Information Age.

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AMERICA NEEDS A NEW POLITICS OF HIGHER PURPOSE THAT ADDRESSES BROAD NATIONAL CONCERNS, NOT NARROW SPECIAL INTERESTS.

Those principles are grounded in values that are fundamental to our country's enduring greatness: work, family, responsibility, individual liberty, faith, and inclusion.

We are undertaking **Blueprint** because we believe that America needs a new politics for the 21st century. It should be a politics of higher purpose, a politics that focuses on building America's future, not trying to reconstruct her past; a politics that addresses broad national concerns, not narrow, special interests.

Above all, the politics of higher purpose must keep pace with the revolutionary changes that are shattering old assumptions. From South Africa to Central America, from Eastern Europe to East Asia, citizens have brought down old dictatorships and built up new democracies. In America and all over the world, the rapid transformation from the Industrial Age to the Information Age is changing the way people work and live and, in turn, the way they demand to govern themselves.

The most innovative progressive leaders and their political parties — most notably Bill Clinton's New Democrats in America and Tony Blair's New Labor in Great Britain — have based their ideas in the Third Way politics that transcends the once dominant, but clearly exhausted left-right debate of the past. The Third Way rejects both the left's reflexive defense of big government at any cost and the right's destructive bid to dismantle it with no replacement. It offers a constructive, modern role for government — to create opportunities by equipping people with the tools that they need to succeed amid the vast changes of our times.

In that context, **Blueprint** is both a continuation and a new beginning. It will build on the progress wrought by the New Democrats and the Clinton-Gore administration in putting Third Way ideas into action. By balancing the federal budget, aiding the transition to the New Economy, replacing a welfare system of dependency with a work system of hope, initiating a modernization of government, imposing tough measures to fight crime in our communities, and establishing America's new leadership role in the world, the Clinton-Gore administration has resolved many of the major political debates of the past quarter century. These efforts have proved that Democrats could begin to wring the excesses out of the outmoded government of the past and start the process of again making government a progressive ally to the aspirations of all Americans.

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THE THIRD WAY OFFERS A CONSTRUCTIVE, MODERN ROLE FOR GOVERNMENT — TO CREATE OPPORTUNITIES BY EQUIPPING PEOPLE WITH THE TOOLS THEY NEED TO SUCCEED AMID THE VAST CHANGES OF OUR TIMES.

In **Blueprint**, we will take the next crucial steps, offering solutions to the very different challenges our country will face in the 21st century. Among other concerns, we will explore: Expanding the winner's circle in a New Economy where rapid change creates both enormous opportunity and high anxiety; making economic globalization work for us when protectionist pressures are rising from both political extremes; assuring America's security and freedom's advance in the world; balancing work and family; reforming public education for the Information Age; strengthening our democracy, and renewing our civic culture.

In this first issue, we will establish the predicate for those purposes by describing America's Next Politics — the changing landscape on which we must build our progress.

Two of America's premier political scholars, William A. Galston of the University of Maryland and Elaine C. Kamarck of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, both veterans of the New Democrat movement, detail the profound demographic changes within the American electorate and the new political realities of the 21st century. Mark Penn, one of our country's leading public opinion analysts and the premier New Democrat pollster, describes the Democratic Party's new electorate. Daniel Pink explains the growing phenomenon of economic free agents. Andrei Cherny profiles New Democrat leaders of the next generation. And Al From, President of the Democratic Leadership Council, and Will Marshall, President of the Progressive Policy Institute, propose a strategy for building a new Democratic majority.

In these pages, as in those to come, **Blueprint** will be dedicated to a set of simple, yet unavoidable truths: In an age of change, the status quo will not hold. In a time of transformation, new thinking must guide our path. In a new century, our politics must be more than a monument to the past; it must be a movement for the future.✧

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

Realities that will Shape 21st Century Politics

By William A. Galston
and Elaine C. Kamarck

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The 1992 presidential election saw the emergence of a new Democratic Party. Under the leadership of Bill Clinton and Al Gore, Democrats began to redress the mistakes that had been responsible for their post-1968 failures. Tough decisions restored the standing of Democrats as a party of economic growth and opportunity, realigned the party's social policies with middle-class values, and initiated the process of engaging the complex issues of post-Cold War diplomacy. As a successor to New Deal governance and alternative to Republican dismantling efforts, the Clinton/Gore administration championed a new conception of government — broadly supported by the American people — designed to equip individuals, families, and communities with the tools to make their own choices and solve their own problems.



Meanwhile, the Republican presidential coalition that dominated American politics between 1968 and 1992 has frayed. Republicans have begun to pay a price for their much-heralded southern strategy: Over the past 20 years, their general election losses in the midwest, west, and northeast have far exceeded their gains in the south.[1] And the huge increase in self-identified conservatives and members of the religious right as a percentage of Republican primary voters is making it increasingly difficult for the party's nominees to appeal to the center of the electorate in November.[2]

But the success of the Democratic Party at the presidential level has not been replicated at other levels. Twenty-five years ago, Democrats held large majorities in both Houses of Congress, 31 out of 50 governorships, and 60 percent of state legislative houses. Today, by contrast, Republicans control both Houses of Congress, 32 of 50 governorships, and fully half the state legislative chambers.[3]

These contradictory trends are evidence that at the threshold of the 21st century, American politics is unsettled. The New Deal era has ended. But the next political alignment has yet to take hold.

High on the list of reasons for this fluidity is that our country is changing — more profoundly and rapidly than most politicians and political institutions have thus far been able to adapt. In the next half-century, America will be reshaped by the growth of the Information Age economy, by the passing of the New Deal generation, by the shifting geography of where we live, by the altered structures of our families, and by the radically increasing diversity of our society. We call these changes the new realities. They are the plate tectonics of our national life, slowly but inexorably transforming the way we earn our living, structure our social bonds, and understand our politics.

In emphasizing these new realities, our point is not to suggest that demography is destiny or to promote a new 21st century version of interest-group politics. It is rather that these new realities define the substantive challenges facing future political leadership and map the terrain that any effective progressive politics will be compelled to traverse.

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[1] *Between 1976 and 1996, Republicans increased their share of the two-party presidential vote by five percentage points in the south. But during that same period, they lost five points in the Midwest and seven points in the west. Their losses in the northeast totaled a remarkable ten points—double their southern gains. See Appendix Table A: Change in the Republican Percentage of the Two Party Vote between 1976 and 1996 by Region.*

[2] *In the ten states for which we have Republican primary data covering the contested nomination contests from 1976 to 1996, every single state has seen an increase in the number of self identified conservatives in their ranks — as Table B in the Appendix illustrates. In more than half of those states the increase is in the twenty to thirty percent range. Simultaneously, every state has shown a decrease in the number of self identified moderates voting in Republican presidential primaries. See Table C in the Appendix. A large part of the increasing ideological conservatism of the Republican base can be attributed to the activism of the religious right. Questions about the religious right were not asked systematically until the 1996 primaries but Table D in the Appendix shows that of the twenty-six states on which there is Republican primary data for 1996 the religious right constitutes, on average, 29% of the Republican primary electorate - ranging from a low of 15% in Massachusetts to a high of 54% in Mississippi.*

[3] *Data for 1972 US Senate, US House of Representatives, and Governorships from CQ Almanac: 1972. CQ: Washington DC. 1998 US Senate and US House of Representative statistics from www.senate.gov and www.house.gov. State legislative information and number of governorships in 1998 provided by National Conference of State Legislatures.*

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

Reality Number One: The New Economy Favors a Rising Learning Class Over a Declining Working Class

Of the many forces now shifting the ground beneath our feet, probably the most momentous is the advent of a New Economy. We live in a time of change more profound than any since the movement at the end of the 19th century from an agrarian economy to the Industrial Age. In that earlier transformation, people moved from the country to the cities and from farms to factories, altering every aspect of the way they lived.

Today, the industrial era is giving way to an Information Age characterized by extraordinarily rapid technological change and the globalization of economic activity. New technologies are reducing the cost of information storage and transmission, altering modes of production, forcing shifts in corporate structures, and increasing demand for literacy, numeracy, and problem-solving skills throughout the workforce. Spurred in part by these technological changes, the new global economy is characterized by near-instantaneous flows of information, capital, and productive facilities across national boundaries and by intensifying competition in previously sheltered sectors of national economies.

Understanding the political implications of the New Economy is no easy matter. But we are already seeing shifts in the electorate. The old politics was dominated by the class structure of the industrial economy. The concentrations of capital and labor required to compete in the industrial economy generated centralized structures in many aspects of economic, social, and political life. By mid-century, that economy had produced a broad middle class of modest (though rising) levels of income and education that took its cues from large mediating institutions such as big labor, big business, dominant political parties, and a handful of national media outlets.

Today, all that is changing. We can discern the rise of a new Learning Class of workers who will dominate at least the first half of the 21st century. They will be better educated, more affluent, more mobile, and more self-reliant. They are less likely to be influenced by (let alone submit to) large mediating institutions. Their political outlook and behavior will increasingly defy the class-based divisions of the old economy, and they will be increasingly skeptical of centralized, one-size-fits-all solutions. Rather, they will want a government that helps enable them to succeed, enhances the information to make their own choices, and invests in the most dynamic source of progress and security in the New Economy — their own intellectual capital.

"Millions are surging into the upper middle class."

The emergence of this new class is evident in several key developments that are already having a major impact on American life.

The Hollowing Out of the Middle Class (mostly for the better)

Among these key changes is one of the most widely discussed (and politically charged) aspects of the New Economy: the shrinkage of the middle class and widening gap between the wealthy and the poor. Some see these developments as grounds for returning to a New Deal-style politics of class warfare; they seek to mobilize lower-income groups for a new rounds of interventionist, centralized government that protects Americans against all forms of economic insecurity.

The tacit assumption behind this line of argument is that the income gap is growing because of increased downward mobility — that is, because a substantial portion of the population is being forced out of the

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William A. Galston is Professor, School of Public Affairs, the University of Maryland, and Director of the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy. From 1993 until 1995, he was Deputy Assistant for Domestic Policy for President Bill Clinton. Elaine C. Kamarck is Director, Visions for Governance in the 21st Century, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. From 1993 until 1997, she was Senior Policy Advisor for Vice President Al Gore.
Research assistance provided by Jennifer Merolla.

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middle class into working poverty. No doubt this is the case for many lower-skilled workers who have been displaced from secure, high-paying jobs in the manufacturing and defense sectors. A recent report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics indicates that, unlike those at the top and bottom of the wage scale, some Americans in the middle — those making between ten and fifteen dollars per hour — have seen a decline in their real earnings over the past decade.

But overall, the assumption of rising poverty and near-poverty is false. Indeed, the percentage of low-income families is two points below where it was in 1972, at the end of the fabled post-war boom. The heart of the middle class is shrinking — being hollowed out — not because poverty is on the march, but because millions of Americans are surging into the ranks of the upper middle class and wealthy.

In 1968, only 23 percent of the population earned $50,000 or more (in 1996 dollars). By 1996, the proportion of the population earning at that level had jumped to 34 percent. During that same period, the heart of the middle class (families earning $25,000 to $50,000 a year) declined from 39 percent to only 30 percent of the population. Even if we define the "middle class" more broadly, the results are about the same. From 1968 to 1996, the percentage of American families earning in excess of $75,000 (in 1996 dollars) rose by almost 10 points, from 6.8 to 16.4, while the percentage earning $25,000 to $75,000 declined by more than seven points.[4]

Why is this happening? Two developments are key. The first is reasonably well known: Compared to the 1970s, the returns to education beyond high school roughly doubled in the 1980s and continue at high levels today. In 1976, a person with a post graduate degree could earn on average 2.6 times as much as someone without a high school education; in 1995, a person with a post graduate degree could earn, on average, four times as much as someone with no high school

Table 1: The Hollowing Out of the Middle Class
Distribution of Household Income



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Money and Income in the U.S., 1996

degree.[5] Many younger Americans have responded to these market signals by increasing the amount of education and training they receive before entering the full-time workforce, while many experienced workers have used institutions such as community colleges to upgrade their skills. Those who do not improve their skills tend to fall farther behind with each passing year.

The second development is much less well known, but just as important: Marital status is a crucial indicator of economic standing and prospects, especially for children. Marriage is one of the best anti-poverty programs ever invented; fewer than six percent of married couples live in poverty, versus 11 percent of all families.[6] Over the past two decades, the median family income of married couples with minor children has risen from $45,500 (in 1996 dollars) to nearly $51,800.[7]

During that same period, the median income of female-headed households with minor children stagnated at about $16,000.[8] Sharp increases in rates of divorce and non-marital births have thus contributed to the widening gap between the upper middle class

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[4] *U.S. Bureau of the Census. Money and Income in the United States. 1996.*

[5] *According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, someone without a high school diploma in 1976 earned on average $6,720, someone with a post graduate degree earned $17,911. In 1995 someone without a high school degree earned $14,013; someone with a post graduate degree earned $56,667. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey. Http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/education/tablea-03.txt.*

[6] *U.S. Bureau of the Census. Poverty in the United States: 1996.*

[7] *U.S. Bureau of the Census. Historic Income tables from the Current Population Survey.*

[8] *Ibid.*

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and poor. And because a rising percentage of children now live in divorced or never-married families, the poverty rate among children has risen sharply over the past quarter century and is now 20.5 percent, nearly seven points higher than the rate for the population as

Table 2: Median Family Income —1976 to 1996 (in 1996 dollars)



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, SM-1 Families, by presence of own children under 18

a whole.[9] Thus, while the percentage of poor households has not increased in the past generation, the composition of those households has changed: economic stagnation and poverty — or otherwise put, the failure to achieve middle-class economic status — are more closely correlated with family structure than ever before. There is, in short, a sociological dimension to the economic phenomenon we have called the hollowing-out of the middle class.

It is not hard to understand why family structure matters more and more in the New Economy. It was always hard for single adults to combine the challenges of parent and wage earner. Today, a third key challenge — getting more education and training, not just at the outset, but throughout one's working life — has been added to the first two. For single parents, competing successfully in the economy is harder than ever. Public policy will be hard-put to keep the divisions between married parents and single parents from widening further.

These trends have affected Democrats more than Republicans. Republican voters have always been wealthier than the population as a whole. But over the past two decades, the gap between Republicans and the general population has remained constant. Not so for Democrats. In 1976, the income of the median Democratic presidential voter was barely above the national median; today, the median Democratic voter is significantly above the national median.[10]

The political consequences of these facts are obvious. On the one hand, it is a mistake to believe that Democrats can construct majorities based on a swelling pool of poor and near-poor Americans waiting to be mobilized by an old-fashioned politics of redistribution; no such increase has occurred. On the other hand, the tens of millions of Americans who have seen no increase in their wages over the past decade need, deserve, and are likely to demand policies that increase access to education, training, and lifelong learning. For these people who (in President Clinton's well-known phrase) "work hard and play by the rules," measures that offer hope of expanding opportunity represent both sound policy and smart politics.

An Educational Bias in the Electorate

These economic trends will yield important benefits for whichever party masters the imperatives of the new Learning Class. One of the most stable findings in political science is that education, more than anything else, predisposes citizens to vote.[11] As the heart of the middle class shrinks and the upper-middle class expands, the upscale bias of the electorate — those who actually turn out to vote — has expanded out of

[9] *U.S. Bureau of the Census. Poverty in the United States: 1996.*

[10] *In 1976 median family income of Carter voters was $12,889 according to that year's exit polls while median household income, according to the census was $12,686. In 1996, median income of Clinton voters was $38,518 while median income of all U.S. households was $35,492. 1976 provided by the Roper Center, at the University of Connecticut from CBS/NYT Exit Polls. 1996 provided by Voter News Service from CNN Exit Polls. U.S. Households from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey. www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/h05.html.*

[11] *See Raymond E. Wolfinger and Steven J. Rosenstone, Who Votes? New Haven: Yale University Press. 1980.*

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

proportion to what would be expected simply given the increased share of highly educated people in the population.

For example, while the percentage of Americans in the voting age population with college degrees has risen from 15.3 percent to 22 percent over the past sixteen years,[12] the percentage of college-educated voters has increased from 28 percent to 43 percent.[13] During this same period, the percentage of voters with less than a high school education has fallen even more rapidly than has their share of the voting-age population.

These upscale trends are mirrored among presidential primary voters. In the 27 states for which there are Democratic presidential exit polls for 1992, (the last time the Democrats had a nomination contest), on average 38 percent of the primary voters had a college or a post-graduate degree, compared to only 20 percent of the voting age population.[14] For Republicans, the educational bias is even more pronounced. In the 26 states for which there are Republican presidential primary exit polls in 1996, 47 percent of their primary voters had college or post-graduate degrees, compared to only 21 percent of the voting age population.[15] Meanwhile, the already low participation level of voters without a high school education decreased in all 11 states for which we have continuous data — sometimes by as much as 50 percent.[16]

The rapid growth of these new groups of upscale workers and their dominance in both the primaries and general elections is already producing new patterns of political behavior, which are likely to become more pronounced in coming years. These voters will almost certainly emphasize education for their children and lifelong learning for themselves. They will stress the importance of middle class values and of the alignment of public policy with those values.[17] They will be equipped with the training and technology needed to acquire information for themselves through multiple sources, further diminishing the already shrunken role of mediating institutions. They are likely to believe in self-reliance, but backed by government that empowers. And they are likely to be independent in their political outlook.

Changes in Labor Union Participation

The pressure exerted by the New Economy on centralized structures and large mediating institutions is nowhere more obvious than in the decline of organized labor as a force within the Democratic Party. Indeed, from 1976 to 1992, labor's share of the Democratic primary vote has fallen in every single state for which data exist.

A similar decline is evident in general elections. In 1976 union households constituted 41 percent of the Democratic presidential vote. By 1984 when the nominee was Walter Mondale, a fervent lifelong supporter of organized labor, the union percentage of the Democratic vote was down to 37 percent. By 1996 it had decreased to 28 percent.[18]

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[12] *U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P20-322, "Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1976, and Series P20-504, "Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1996."*

[13] *1980 data provided by The Roper Center at the University of Connecticut from CBS/NYT Exit Polls. 1996 data provided by Voter News Service from CNN Exit Polls. For a fuller discussion of education levels and trends in exit polls, see Samuel L. Popkin and Michael P. McDonald, "Who Votes?," this issue.*

[14] *Provided by Voter News Service from CNN Exit Polls. Educational Attainment of the Population from the US Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P20-466, "Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1992." See Appendix Table E.*

[15] *CNN exit polls from www.allpolitics.com/1996/polls/exitpolls. Educational Attainment of the Population from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P20-504, "Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1996." See Appendix Table F.*

[16] *To determine whether the composition of primary electorates had changed over time we constructed a representation ratio which compared the number of people at each educational level who voted in a state's presidential primary with their presence in the population. That way we can look at changes in who participates while simultaneously accounting for the fact that over this same period of time educational levels have risen. A representation ratio of 1.0 indicates that the group is voting in exact proportion to their presence in the population. Numbers over 1.0 mean that the group is over represented in the presidential primary and numbers less than 1.0 mean that the group is underrepresented. See Table G in the Appendix. Also see James Lengle, "Presidential Primaries and Representation" in Presidential Politics edited by James I. Lengle and Byron E. Shafer, St. Martin's Press, 1983, for a similar methodology used to look at the 1972 California primary.*

[17] *For the most recent and authoritative account of middle-class values, see Alan Wolfe, One Nation, After All (New York: Viking, 1998).*

[18] *1976 data provided by The Roper Center, at the University of Connecticut from CBS/NYT Exit Polls. 1984 data from The 84 Vote: ABC News. 1998 data from The 88 Vote: ABC News. 1996 data provided by Voter News Service from CNN Exit Polls.*

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Table 3: Union Households as a Percentage of Democratic Primary Voters

	1976	1980	1984	1992
STATE				
California	37	43	35	33
Florida	30	n/a	24	14
Illinois	45	54	40	23
Indiana	49	n/a	n/a	35
Massachusetts	36	40	29	21
Michigan	64	n/a	n/a	33
New Hampshire	24	n/a	25	18
New York	50	52	49	28
Ohio	50	44	47	39
Pennsylvania	51	49	49	40
Wisconsin	45	45	n/a	35

Source: 1976 and 1980 data provided by The Roper Center, at the University of Connecticut from CBS/NYT Exit Polls. 1984 data from The 84 Vote: ABC News. 1996 data provided by Voter News Service from CNN Exit Polls. (Data for the 1988 Democratic primaries is not included due to faulty exit polls in that year.)

It is not the case that unions have become dramatically less effective in turning out their members.[19] Rather, the key trend is that overall union membership has fallen significantly during this time — a sign of the shift from industrial era mass production to the new dynamics of the Information Age. In 1955, 24.4 percent of the total workforce belonged to labor unions.[20] Two decades later, in 1976, union members were still 20.3 percent of the workforce. But today, that figure has shrunk to only 14.5 percent.[21] This trend has been especially pronounced in the private sector, where union members have fallen from 13.6 percent of the total workforce in 1983 to 8.4 percent in 1996. In addition, the composition of the labor movement has changed dramatically. In the 1950s, public sector workers accounted for an insignificant portion of the labor movement. By 1983, public sector workers accounted for 32 percent of union members, and by 1996, fully 42 percent.[22]

Simply put, the dynamics of the New Economy are working against labor unions. With the exception of some public sector workers, unions have as yet been unable to mobilize New Economy workers — a group that will continue to grow. As labor's share of the Democratic vote declines, the share provided by better-educated upscale voters will increase further. That means that unions will be less and less likely to provide working majorities, even during primaries.

Unions continue to be effective in mobilizing voters, however — particularly those toward the lower end of the socioeconomic scale. For that reason, they remain key elements of progressive electoral coalitions, especially in primaries in which turnout is low, but also in general elections.

A 21st century progressive majority must forge a coalition of union voters and non-unionized New Economy workers. But that coalition must revolve around a shared agenda of growth and expanding opportunity within a global economy whose pervasive effects can be neither denied nor reversed.

The Emergence of Wired Workers

As traditional unionized workers decline, another group is emerging that provides a preview of how the politics of the next half-century will diverge from that of the last.

The Institute for a New California has completed two surveys of California's population, first in 1996 and

[19] *Table H in the Appendix constructs a representation ratio for each state and each year for which we have data. It compares the members of union households voting in the primary with the overall union membership in the population of the state. By comparing these ratios over time we can tell whether or not the unions are increasing or decreasing in their ability to get out their members.*

[20] *U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics, annual; and Directory of National Unions and Employee Associations, 1979. Union Members as a Percent of Total Workforce.*

[21] *Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Union Members in 1997." January 1998.*

[22] *The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Washington, DC, Union membership and Earnings Data Book: Compilations from the Current Population Survey (1997 edition), (copyright by BNA PLUS); authored by Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson of Florida State University.*

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again in 1998. These polls have defined a new category of "wired workers" who regularly use computers on the job, work in self-directed teams rather than top-down hierarchies, and engage in on-the-job problem-solving rather than repetitive routines. Using these criteria, the polls divided Californians into three categories: traditional workers, wired workers, and individuals outside the paid workforce.

Under this definition, wired workers represent an increasingly significant portion of the California population. In 1996, these workers constituted 31 percent of the population and nearly half the working population. Just two years later, wired workers were 37 percent of the population and more than half the workforce. If these trends continue, these workers will come to dominate California's population early in the next century.

This group is not dramatically different from the population at large or from the voting population. While 45 percent of wired workers have college or post-graduate degrees, 55 percent do not. 52 percent earn over $50,000 per year; the rest earn less. Their party identification is nearly evenly divided among Democrats (35 percent), Independents (32 percent) and Republicans (27 percent).



More significant differences emerge when we closely examine the politics of wired workers. Neither their behavior nor outlook fits neatly into traditional categories of liberal and conservative. In 1996, for example, this group supported Bill Clinton while voting for Republicans at the state and congressional levels. Thus they are a key part of the bloc of swing voters to whom Democrats must appeal in the next century if they wish to retain the presidency, regain control of Congress, and reverse the Republican tide at the state and local level.[23]

Underlying this independent political behavior is a distinctive set of political views. One of the dominant features of this group is a rising spirit of self-reliance. For example, wired workers are much more likely to want government to encourage individual savings than to make heroic efforts to save Social Security in its traditional New Deal form. They are more likely to believe that government should make sure that people are free to pursue opportunity and less inclined to believe that government is directly responsible for improving people's lives. They are more likely to believe that government should set the overall rules for the market and then let market decisions control outcomes.

Substantively, wired workers represent a subtle and unpredictable mix of conservative and liberal views. On the one hand, they are very critical of existing public schools (and highly supportive of public charter schools), tend to favor privatization of public services such as mass transit, and are less supportive of affirmative action than are traditional workers. On the other hand, they want government to stay out of lifestyle issues, are more supportive of immigration, and believe in active government protection for the environment, including severe penalties for businesses that pollute.

In short, while wired workers don't want to pull the plug on government, they do want to change the way government operates. They are open to the use of market mechanisms and are broadly tolerant in their social outlook. And for reasons that we do not yet fully understand, they do not feel that their views are adequately represented by either major political party. It seems safe to say that as these new-generation workers become demographically dominant (in California and throughout much of the nation) not long into the next century, their new interests and outlooks will be major forces reshaping American politics.

The technological developments spurring the emergence of wired workers are beginning to have pervasive

[23] *"Attitudes of California Wired Workers and Traditional Workers," Prepared for the Institute for the New California, May, 1998 by Frank N. Magid Associates, Inc.*

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

effects throughout our society. Consider, for example, the ways in which citizens acquire political information. As recently as 1993, 60 percent of adults reported that they 'regularly' watched the nightly TV network news. Today, that figure is down to 38 percent. Meanwhile, the number of Americans who regularly get news from cable television has risen sharply to 40 percent, while regular online Internet users have tripled from 11 to 36 million (6 percent to 20 percent) in just the past two years. Forty-eight percent of Americans with family incomes of $75,000 or more go online for information every day. These patterns are especially pronounced among younger upscale adults. Fully 49 percent of Americans aged 18 to 29 with at least some college education go online for information every day.[24]

These trends are bound to break down information oligopolies and give greater control to individual citizens. Education and the low cost of information will add momentum to the hard-to-classify political independence we can already observe. In the Industrial Age political power was related to the ability to build or control mediating institutions; in the Information Age political power will rest on the ability to compete in the marketplace of ideas.



Reality Number Two: The New Deal Generation Gives Way to the Skeptical Generations

Nothing is more inexorable than generational replacement. The political significance of this process lies in the fact that a generation's formative experiences generate a common understanding of society that shapes political attitudes and behavior throughout a generation's life-cycle.[25] And given the dynamics of generational replacement in contemporary America, a new reality is emerging that is already having a profound effect on our politics.

The old politics was dominated by a generation of Americans whose formative experience was a powerful, centralized, and effective federal government. The politics of the next 50 years will be dominated by generations whose experiences have made them more skeptical of centralized government solutions (and of large institutions in general) while remaining receptive to a more modest government that bolsters individual opportunities and protects common goods.

The generation that has dominated national politics for much of the past half century — the New Deal generation — is passing from the scene faster than is generally understood. This generation includes individuals born between 1911 and 1926, who came of age during the Depression or Second World War and were able to cast their first ballots in one of the five presidential elections beginning with Franklin D Roosevelt's initial win in 1932 and ending with Harry Truman's upset victory in 1948. So defined, the New Dealers constituted nearly 39 percent of the electorate in 1952 and remained a formidable portion of the electorate until the 1980s.[26] But to understand the scope of the changes at work here, one statistic stands out: In 2000, this same New Deal generation will account for only eight percent of the voting age population and an even smaller share of the electorate.[27]

This matters because the New Dealers by and large see central government as having conducted the people's business effectively and honorably. Their formative experiences were New Deal economic and social policies; America's successful fight for freedom in World War II; the massive post-war investment in people (the G.I. Bill, for example), science, education, and infrastructure; rapid economic growth with widely shared benefits; and an effective response to Cold War challenges through NATO and the Marshall Plan.

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[24] *"Event Driven News Audiences: Internet News Takes Off," Pew Research Center for People and the Press," June 8, 1998.*
[25] *See especially Warren E. Miller and J. Merrill Shanks, The New American Voter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), Part II.*
[26] *The National Election Studies. The NES sample for this age group is representative of the population. It diverges from Census data by two percentage points at the most and by zero percentage points in some years.*
[27] *U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P25-1130. February 1996.*

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Table 4: Presence of New Dealers in the Electorate 1952 to 1996



Source: National Election Study.

Succeeding cohorts, by contrast, have been shaped by a different set of experiences — the failed Vietnam War; a president compelled to resign in disgrace; an economy characterized by slower growth, less widely shared, coupled with higher inflation. In their lives, politicians shifted away from governance toward a permanent campaign in which attacks on government were a staple of political combat. This was coupled with a shift in the media's political coverage in the direction of tactical manipulation and personal scandal.



The gradual disappearance of the New Dealers from the electorate closely tracks the weakening of trust and confidence in government, diminished voting participation, and a growing disengagement from many aspects of civic life. (The political scientist Robert Putnam has labeled New Dealers the "civic generation" and has shown that at each point in the life-cycle and at every level of education, generations following the New Dealers are less engaged in voluntary associations and civic affairs.[28]) In 1964, 76 percent of Americans trusted the federal government to do what's right all or most of the time. Today, barely half as many do. More than 60 percent agreed that government is run for the benefit of all people rather than the special interests and disagreed with the charge that public officials don't care what average citizens think. Today, fewer than half as many do.[29]

It is typical to contrast the New Deal generation with baby boomers, the cohort born between 1946 and 1964 that currently dominates American politics and society. But the politics of the next half-century will also be shaped by "Generation X" — typically defined as young Americans born between 1965 and 1978 — a cohort that differs significantly from both New Dealers and baby boomers. For boomers, key formative experiences included not only political assassinations, Vietnam, and the Watergate scandal, but also influential social movements — for women's rights and environmental protection and against segregation. As a result, boomers tend simultaneously to mistrust the authority of traditional institutions and to believe in the power of collective action motivated by ideals.

GenXers' key formative generational experiences include economic insecurity, rising crime rates, unprecedented family instability, a government whose main product appeared to be a huge and unending budget deficit, and a society whose capacity for effective idealism seemed spent. While GenXers tend to be "liberal" on issues such as race relations, diversity, and sexual morality (including homosexuality), their negative experiences with crime and divorce have made then quite "conservative" on these issues.[30] Not having experienced first-hand the changes wrought by social movements, they tend to be ironic and cynical when confronted with idealistic claims. The experience of ineffective government has pushed them toward self-reliance and entrepreneurship; they

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[28] *See "Bowling Alone," Robert D. Putnam. Journal of Democracy 6:1, January 1995, 65-78.*

[29] *Source: National Election Studies*

[30] *"The Twentysomethings: Generation Myths," Everett Carl Ladd. The Public Perspective 5:2, January/February 1994, 14-18.*

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

are more inclined than were their predecessors to believe that they will have to depend on their own efforts to get what they want out of life, and they are far more likely to be starting new businesses.[31]

Nevertheless, GenXers do believe in a role for government in two areas. The first is education, reflecting the fact that for this generation education is more closely tied to economic well being than ever before. The second is the environment. For this generation, the environment is a much more serious issue than it is for their elders and an issue on which, in spite of their skepticism they support activist government. When Americans are asked whether environmental protection can go hand in hand with economic growth, GenXers agree more strongly than do any of the older age groups.[32]

But GenXers are much less likely to be interested or to participate in politics than were young people in previous generations. The voting gap between younger and older adults has been increasing steadily over the past three decades, and the participation rate among younger adults has fallen by more than 20 percentage points. Surveys of college freshmen indicate that compared to 30 years ago, only half as many follow politics closely or even read newspapers regularly.[33]

While GenXers have not withdrawn entirely into their private lives, the venue of their civic activity has shifted from official politics and national social movements to the community level. According to one survey, 62 percent believe that "the best way to make a difference is to get involved in your local community, because that's where you can solve the problems that really affect people."[34]

As these younger Americans mature, candidates must respond to their conviction that large-scale politics is a blunt and ineffective instrument for addressing key social problems, even as they support greater efforts aimed at a handful of key national challenges. Thus the politics of the 21st century must be more selective in the use of federal power and must find new cooperative — not coercive — ways to mobilize support at many levels of government as well as among non-governmental civic associations. Leadership at the national level will, of necessity, require a very different understanding and set of skills than in the command-and-control era that served the New Deal generation so well.



Reality Number Three: Power Continues to Shift from the Cities to the Suburbs

Suburbanization moved into high gear with the return of the World War II G.I.'s and the post-war baby boom. But even as the baby boom slowed in the 1960s, suburbanization continued. Crime, poor schools, and a diminished quality of life drove many middle class families out of our central cities. Over the past three decades, the rapidly growing African-American middle class has followed whites in pursuit of the American Dream. Significantly, during this period, many suburbs ceased to be simply "bedrooms" for urban-based jobs and developed their own thriving economies based on sectors such as retail and high-tech services.

As big cities displaced small towns as the center of political life at the turn of the 20th century, so today, suburbs are displacing cities. While most Americans have a general sense of this phenomenon, its dimensions are not fully appreciated — even by political experts.

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[31] *See, "Generation X Reignites the American Dream," TWBA Chiat/Day and Yankelovich Partners Releases Colloborative Study, NY, May 27, 1997. Also see, "Rocking the Ages: The Yankelovich Report on Generational Marketing," J. Walker Smith and Ann Clurman. Harper Business: New York. 1997. Also see, Chris Rugaber Journal X online magazine, May, 1998.*

[32] *See "Report Card: Environmental Attitudes and Knowledge in America: The Fifth Annual Survey of Adult Americans." Prepared for the National Environmental Education and Training Foundation, December 1996.*

[33] *"Why Young Americans Hate Politics, and What We Should Do About it," Stephen E. Bennett. PS March 1997, 47-53.*

[34] *"Youth Voices," May 1996.*

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

Accordingly, we offer a small sample of statistics that illustrate and dramatize this historic shift.

In the 1960 election, the city of Chicago cast 35 percent of the statewide vote in Illinois, and it dominated ten of the state's congressional districts. Chicago's suburbs contributed only 20 percent of the statewide vote and controlled only five congressional districts. By 1996, however, it was the city of Chicago that cast only 20 percent of the statewide vote and commanded only five congressional districts, while its suburbs doubled their share of the statewide vote to 40 percent and now control nine congressional seats.[35]

This pattern has been repeated in most states with once-dominant cities. These trends are continuing, pointing to a key shift from the old politics to the new: In the old politics, Democrats could build majorities around their control of large urban centers. In the 21st century, the center of gravity of American politics will be in the suburbs, with cities continuing to play an important role, but one that will have to be coordinated with the dominant concerns of suburban voters.[36]

These trends are already evident at the national level. A quarter of a century ago, there were roughly equal numbers of urban, suburban, and rural districts in the U.S. House of Representatives. Today, suburban districts outnumber urban districts by more than 2 to 1, and rural districts by almost 3 to 1.[37]

Suburbs proved to be the key to Bill Clinton's two victories. Of 28 key suburban counties, Bill Clinton carried 18 in 1992 and 24 in 1996. (By contrast, Jimmy Carter carried only six in his 1976 victory.) Remarkably, in 1996 Clinton prevailed in 16 suburban counties that had not gone Democratic in modern political history. In 24 of these 28 key counties, Clinton's percentage of the vote in 1996 was higher than Carter's in 1976; in seven of them, there were huge swings of more than 10 percentage points.[38]

Still, Democrats have not achieved a comparable suburban breakthrough below the presidential level. In 1996, for example, 38 of the suburban congressional districts Bill Clinton carried also sent Republicans to Congress. (By contrast, only one suburban district carried by Bob Dole sent a Democrat to Congress.) Put simply: If Democratic congressional candidates had matched Clinton's suburban success, Newt Gingrich would have lost his majority in the U.S. House of Representatives.

This emphasis on the growing power of suburbs does not mean that the politics of the 21st century will

Table 5: The Shifting Balance Between Cities and Suburbs

	% of Statewide Vote 1952	% of Statewide Vote 1996
City		
New York	48	31
Chicago	41	20
Philadelphia	21	12
Detroit	29	8
Boston	15	7
Baltimore	39	10
Milwaukee	19	9

Source: Rhodes Cook, *Cities: Decidedly Democratic, Declining in Population. CQ.* July 12, 1997. Page 1648.

[35] *"Wealth, the Suburbs and Ticket-Splitting" by CQ staff, 4/17/98, http://library.cq.com.cgi-bin/do.*

[36] *In emphasizing the growing political importance of suburbs, we must remember that they are by no means static or monolithic. Comparisons of voting patterns over time in specific suburban jurisdictions will have to take into account significant demographic changes wrought by trends such as outmigration to the "exurbs" and inmigration by minorities. In turn, established and newer suburbs often differ greatly in income levels, family characteristics, and political traditions. Finally, voting behavior in suburban communities can vary sharply between federal and state/local contests, in part because new presidential or congressional elections turn on the growth management issues that often dominate suburban politics at the county and municipal levels.*

[37] *"Suburbia: Land of Varied Faces and a Growing Political Force," Rhodes Cook. CQ Weekly Report May 24, 1997, 1214.*

[38] *Ibid, page 1216 for 1992 and 1996 data, 1976 data taken from America at the Polls 2: The Vote for President 1968-1984. Scammon and McGillivray, Eds. Elections Research Center. CQ: 1988.*

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be solely suburban based. The New Economy hardly renders cities an anachronism. If anything, their role as hubs of commerce, innovation, and culture may turn out to be more important than ever. Democrats will have to build solid coalitions between suburbs and central cities in order to form sustainable national majorities. But there will be a key shift: While in the old politics, the cities served as the center of the Democrats' political universe, in the 21st century that role will shift to the suburbs.

In recent decades, cities and suburbs have often been at odds, divided by racial and ethnic differences as well as by competition for scarce federal resources. Today, new forces point to a convergence of values and interests that hold out hope for a more harmonious relationship. Suburbs are becoming more racially and ethnically diverse, but new suburbanites are concerned with the same quality of life issues that first drove mass suburbanization after World War Two. At the same time, a new breed of forward-looking mayors around the nation has won a mandate to turn around urban centers by addressing the same set of challenges. The potential exists for finding cross-cutting issues such as quality education, public safety, sustainable economic development, and environmental preservation that can form the basis for a 21st century progressive coalition between suburbs and cities.

Reality Number Four: More Children from More Diverse Backgrounds Will Be Concentrated in a Shrinking Percentage of Households

Few changes in our society over the past half century have been more important than those affecting the American family. Now, one of the most fascinating developments related to families has the potential to create a major new set of challenges for American politics. In the old politics, the electorate was dominated by families with minor children. In the 21st century, a far smaller percentage of households will contain young children and yet the number of young children will reach record highs, greatly complicating the task of maintaining an effective coalition on behalf of children and families.

We know that there has been a massive shift away from marriage and childrearing as the dominant way of life. In 1950, 78 percent of all U.S. households were married couples, compared to only 54 percent today. In 1950, married couples with minor children comprised 43 percent of all households, compared to only 24 percent today. And there has been an equally significant shift away from marriage as the preferred venue for raising children. In 1950, 93 percent of all families with minor children were married couples; today, that figure is down to 73 percent.[39]

These changes have accelerated over the past generation. As recently as 1970, 85 percent of all minor children were living with both parents, versus only 68 percent today, while the percentage living with their mothers only has more than doubled, from 11 percent to 24 percent. During that same period, never-married adults rose from 16 percent to 23 percent of the adult population, while the median age of first marriage rose by more than four years for both men and women. Meanwhile, the percentage of divorced men and women in the total adult population exactly tripled.[40]

Some of these trends may eventually abate. The rate of divorce peaked in the early 1980s and has declined perceptibly since then. After a relentless rise, out-of-wedlock births may be stabilizing, albeit at frightening high levels. Still, the process of generational replacement virtually ensures that the erosion of marriage will persist

[39] *U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P20-495, "Household and Family Characteristics: March 1996 (Update)."*
[40] *U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, P20-496, "Marital Status and Living Arrangements: March 1996" and earlier reports. Source: Census Bureau, March 1998.*

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for some time to come. The Census Bureau projects that by 2010, married couples will constitute barely half of total households, while married couples with minor children will be only 20 percent of total households and only 72 percent of all families with children. And taken as a whole, families with children will account for little more than one-quarter of all households — the lowest share in recorded U.S. history.[41]

Another key trend — the relentless aging of the U.S. population — ensures that the percentage of families with minor children will continue to decline through the first half of the 21 century. Today, about 12 percent of the population is aged 65 or older. But by 2050, according to Social Security estimates that many regard as conservative, Americans 65 and over will surge to an unprecedented 20.8 percent of the population.[42]

Meanwhile, the number of children younger than 18 has risen sharply during the past decade and just last year topped the previous record set at the end of the baby boom in 1966. This increase is expected to persist throughout the first half of the 21st century, with the number of children expected to exceed 90 million in 2050, versus just 70 million today. And more than 90 percent of this increase will come as the result of immigration (principally Hispanic and Asian), so that young people as a group will be even more diverse than the population as a whole.[43]

Taken together, these developments pose a paradox: The needs of children will be increasingly central to the welfare of our society in the 21st century, but the percentage of families with minor children will continue to shrink. A sustainable majority coalition on behalf of children must therefore include more and more households without children, and it must rest on the principle of shared responsibility for all children in our society. The direct appeal to parental self-interest will no longer suffice to support child-friendly policies, as it did during the height of the baby boom.

The alternative to such a broad-based coalition may well be a growing split between an upscale electorate and tens of millions of children — many of them poor, minority, or immigrant — on whom our future will depend, as well as heightened tension between programs directed to children and those that provide income and health security for older Americans. Because an effective 21st century progressive coalition cannot survive such strains, Democrats must begin working now to surmount them.



Reality Number Five: A New Diversity Brings the Challenge of National Identity Politics

The challenge of sustaining a coalition for children — and more broadly, of building a 21st century progressive politics — will be complicated by America's changing ethnic makeup. These changes present both dangers and opportunities. The danger is that they could intensify fissures among competing ethnic groups. The opportunity is that grappling with them could spur a new politics of national rather than group identity.

In the old politics, black/white divisions were at the heart of central strategies for both parties, whether it was the Republicans' temptation to practice wedge politics or Democrats' attraction to identity politics. In an increasingly multiethnic politics, these strategies are less likely to succeed and might be replaced by unifying appeals to shared national values and to the opportunities of the New Economy.

America's immigration policy is bringing on many of these shifts. In the mid-1920s, the United States adopted highly restrictive immigration laws. During the 40 years

[41] *U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Projected Number of Families with children Under 18 by Type: 1995 to 2010" and "Projections of Households by Type: 1995 to 2010." Middle Series Projections, May 1996.*

[42] *Board of Trustees, OASDI, reprinted in C. Eugene Steuerle and Jon M. Bakija, Retooling Social Security for the 21st Century: Right and Wrong Approaches to Reform (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press, 1994), p. 49.*

[43] *U.S. Bureau of the Census.*

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that these laws remained in effect, the percentage of foreign-born Americans fell steadily, hitting an historic low of under 5 percent.[44] Starting in 1965, however, immigration legislation changed dramatically — in the aggregate, with many more immigrants being admitted — and in distribution, with the bulk coming from areas (such as Latin America and Asia) that had been under-represented in previous flows.

The results of this policy shift are already visible. The percentage of foreign-born Americans has doubled from its low in the mid-1960s; nearly 11 percent of the population is now Hispanic (versus 12 percent for African-Americans), while more than 3 percent is Asian. In New York City, Hispanics now constitute the largest minority group, and more than one-third of the population is foreign-born. In 1997, for the first time ever, the number of Hispanic children surpassed the number of African-American children.[45]

These changes will accelerate over the next half century as indicated by Table 6. Perhaps as early as 2005, and certainly within the next ten years, Hispanics will become the nation's largest minority group.[47] By 2050, Hispanics will constitute almost one-quarter of the U.S. population, while Asians will total more than 8 percent. The African-American population will grow more slowly, to about 13.5 percent. Meanwhile, the percentage of Americans classified as non-Hispanic whites will fall to under 53 percent. In a number of important states, this group will be in the minority. (If current trends continue, this will happen in California before the year 2000 presidential election.)[48]

TABLE 6: Resident Population of the United States, Middle Series Projections, 1997 to 2050, by Origin[46]



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Resident Population of the United States: Middle Series Projections, 1996–2050.

[44] *U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Kristen A. Hansen and Carol S. Farber, "The Foreign Born Population: 1996."*
[45] *U.S. Bureau of the Census.*
[46] *U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series 25-1130, "Population Projections of the United States by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin." February 1996.*
[47] *U.S. Bureau of the Census, PPL #47, "Projected State Populations by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1995 to 2025." The U.S. Bureau of the Census projects persons of Hispanic origin to account for 32.7% and non-Hispanic Whites to account for 47.9% of California's Population in the year 2000.*
[48] *Ibid.*

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

Over time, these changes will transform the electorate. Already, between 1992 and 1996, the Hispanic share of the national electorate more than doubled. In California, it grew to 11 percent, up from eight percent in 1992; in Texas, from ten to 16 percent, and from five to 12 percent in Florida.[49]

As these transformations unfold, the tendency to use race and ethnicity as wedge issues becomes manifestly counterproductive as the white majority dwindles and, in key states, actually becomes a minority. There are hopeful early signs that Republican candidates in California, Texas, and Florida are rethinking political strategies that have alienated African American and (more recently) Hispanic voters from their party.

The pressure on the Democratic Party is subtler but, we believe, no less significant. In an increasingly multiethnic democracy, different minority groups will have increasingly diverse interests and demands; this will make it increasingly difficult to undertake a "one-from-column A, one-from-column-B" set of narrowly targeted appeals to some groups without also alienating others who are essential for building a majority coalition. Asian-Americans may not agree with African-Americans about affirmative action; Hispanics and African-Americans may compete for entry-level jobs. And within individual groups, there will be an increasing diversity of interests — for example, between upwardly mobile middle class African-Americans and others who remain in poverty — that will make appeals to individual groups more complicated than in the past. In the face of these difficulties, the identity politics of the post-sixties Democratic Party will prove no more sustainable than the Republicans' wedge strategy.

This new diversity need not lead to new forms of divisiveness, however. Not only are patriotism and the unifying ideals of the American Dream alive and well; practical politicians will be eager to find ways of maximizing vote counts with broad-based appeals. A new politics of national identity can not only answer the call of principle, but also address practical political problems that old-style wedge and identity politics will be powerless to resolve.

There are early signs of hope, including the 1996 reelection of Bill Clinton and Al Gore based on cross-cutting appeals to minority Democratic base voters and mainly white, suburban swing voters. A recent survey of Hispanic leadership by the Tomas Rivera Policy Institute suggests a similar convergence for the future: Domestic issues such as quality education, broad-based economic growth, crime reduction, and improved relations among racial and ethnic groups are likely to play an important role in the coming century's political dialogue. And a recent survey by the Public Agenda Foundation indicates a substantial agreement among white Americans and African-Americans on the nature of quality public education and the steps needed to achieve it.[50] These issues suggest an emerging common ground on which new progressive coalitions can be built.[51]

Conclusion

The new political realities we have explored in this essay will pose new challenges — political and substantive — for leaders and parties who seek the mandate to govern our nation in the next century. How to reconcile the economic interests of two divergent worker classes around a growth agenda that accepts the imperatives of global competition while providing a robust system of economic opportunity and security for all workers? How to honor the values and interests

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[49] *"Latino Voter Turnout More Than Doubles," Bill Schneider. AllPolitics/CNNTime, November 21, 1997.*

[50] *"Here to Stay: The Domestic and Foreign Priorities of Latino Leaders," Public Agenda for the Tomas Rivera Policy Institute, 1998; Steve Farkas and Jean Johnson, "Time to Move On: African-American and White Parents Set an Agenda for Public Schools," Public Agenda, 1998.*

[51] *We may also speculate—if not quite predict—that over the next half-century the meaning of race and ethnicity in America may be fundamentally transformed. Wea already know that rates of intermarriage are rising across the board. It may be that a new, far more pan-ethnic America is beginning to take shape. For some anecdotal evidence and reflections, see "Travels Into America's Future," Robert D. Kaplan. The Atlantic Monthly 282:2, August 1998, 37-61.*

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of suburban voters without sacrificing cities to futures of failing schools, crumbling infrastructure, and chronic lack of jobs? How to design coalitions that support investments for children based on a shared commitment to a common future, not direct personal self-interest? And how to build a politics of inclusion and mutual respect that honors every group while advancing the goal of One America around core principles of individual liberty, equal opportunity, and mutual responsibility?

In short, amidst diversity and disagreement, how can we forge a politics of national purpose so that our differences become mutually reinforcing strengths? These are not easy questions. But no leader, no party that seeks to govern our nation in the next century can avoid them.

We write as Democrats, and we believe that the Democratic Party is best situated to meet these challenges. But we also believe that American politics will be healthier, and the public interest better served, if both major parties compete to offer solutions consistent with the new realities that will shape our 21st century politics. In any contest between New Democrats and new Republicans, the real winners will be the American people. ✧

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Appendix

Table A: Change in the Republican Percentage of the Two Party Vote Between 1976 and 1996 by Region

	1976		% of Two Party Vote		1996		% of Two Party Vote		Change in Republican %
	Carter	Ford	Carter	Ford	Clinton	Dole	Clinton	Dole	
South									
Alabama	644,579	495,318	57	43	662,165	769,044	46	54	11
Arkansas	495,909	266,713	65	35	475,171	325,416	59	41	6
Florida	1,561,383	1,375,296	53	47	2,546,870	244,536	53	47	0
Georgia	959,663	472,610	67	33	1,053,849	1,080,843	49	51	18
Kentucky	612,421	527,956	54	46	636,614	623,283	51	49	3
Louisiana	683,512	606,204	53	47	927,837	712,586	57	43	-4
Mississippi	373,917	362,056	51	49	394,022	439,838	47	53	4
No. Carolina	923,533	738,545	56	44	1,107,849	1,225,938	47	52	8
Oklahoma	530,242	543,221	49	51	488,105	582,315	46	54	3
So. Carolina	443,901	342,409	56	44	506,283	573,458	47	53	9
Tennessee	822,250	633,228	56	44	909,146	863,530	51	49	5
Texas	2,036,484	1,880,581	52	48	2,459,683	2,736,167	47	53	5
Virginia	810,697	834,605	49	51	1,091,060	1,138,350	49	51	0
West Virginia	430,404	311,012	58	42	327,812	233,946	58	42	0
Total	11,328,895	9,389,754	55	45	13,586,511	13,549,250	50	50	5
NE/Mid-Atlantic									
Connecticut	641,010	712,414	47	53	735,740	483,109	60	40	-13
Delaware	122,610	109,926	53	47	140,355	99,062	59	41	-6
District of Columbia	127,562	25,184	84	16	158,220	17,339	90	10	-6
Maine	231,283	234,434	50	50	312,788	186,378	63	37	-13
Maryland	735,618	648,980	53	47	966,207	681,530	59	41	-6
Massachusetts	1,425,476	1,027,883	58	42	1,571,763	718,107	69	31	-11
New Hampshire	147,618	185,472	44	56	246,214	196,532	56	44	-12
New Jersey	1,420,668	1,477,858	49	51	1,652,329	1,103,078	60	40	-11
New York	3,336,665	3,060,695	52	48	3,756,177	1,933,492	66	34	-14
Pennsylvania	2,315,494	2,187,038	51	49	2,215,819	1,801,169	55	45	-4
Rhode Island	216,991	172,138	56	44	233,050	104,683	69	31	-13
Vermont	77,819	99,043	44	56	137,894	80,352	63	37	-19
Total	10,798,814	9,941,065	52	48	12,126,556	7,404,831	62	38	-10

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Table A (continued): Change in the Republican Percentage of the Two Party Vote Between 1976 and 1996 by Region

	1976 Carter	1976 Ford	% of Two Party Vote Carter	% of Two Party Vote Ford	1996 Clinton	1996 Dole	% of Two Party Vote Clinton	% of Two Party Vote Dole	Change in Republican %
Midwest									
Illinois	2,229,605	2,333,260	49	51	2,341,744	1,587,021	60	40	-11
Indiana	1,006,636	1,169,144	46	54	887,424	1,006,693	47	53	-1
Iowa	619,710	632,486	49	51	620,258	492,644	56	44	-7
Kansas	429,008	501,759	46	54	387,659	583,245	40	60	6
Michigan	1,694,388	1,884,867	47	53	1,989,653	1,481,212	57	43	-10
Minnesota	1,067,894	818,120	57	43	1,120,438	766,476	59	41	-2
Missouri	986,185	918,620	52	48	1,025,935	890,016	54	46	-2
Nebraska	230,152	349,736	40	60	236,761	363,467	39	61	1
No. Dakota	134,503	151,515	47	53	106,905	125,050	46	54	1
Ohio	2,000,035	1,992,460	50	50	2,148,222	1,859,883	54	46	-4
So. Dakota	146,153	151,619	49	51	139,333	150,543	48	52	1
Wisconsin	1,037,056	1,003,039	51	49	1,071,971	845,029	56	44	-5
Total	11,581,325	11,906,625	49	51	12,076,303	10,151,279	54	46	-5
West									
Alaska	31,788	55,783	36	64	80,380	122,746	40	60	-4
Arizona	294,668	417,413	41	59	653,288	622,073	51	49	-10
California	3,709,715	3,837,202	49	51	5,119,835	3,828,380	57	43	-8
Colorado	446,807	566,870	44	56	671,152	691,848	49	51	-5
Hawaii	147,375	140,003	51	49	205,012	113,943	64	36	-13
Idaho	126,362	204,188	38	62	165,443	256,595	39	61	-1
Montana	146,696	170,156	46	54	167,922	179,652	48	52	-2
New Mexico	199,225	207,718	49	51	273,495	232,751	54	46	-5
Nevada	92,088	100,926	48	52	203,974	199,244	51	49	-3
Oregon	484,643	485,305	50	50	649,641	538,152	55	45	-5
Utah	180,974	335,144	35	65	221,633	361,911	38	62	-3
Washington	643,333	679,631	49	51	1,123,323	840,712	57	43	-8
Wyoming	62,267	92,831	40	60	77,934	105,388	43	57	-3
Total	6,565,941	7,293,170	47	53	9,613,032	8,093,395	54	46	-7

Table B: Increase in Conservative Identifiers in GOP Primaries, 1976–1996

State	1976	1996	% Increase
California	45	56	11
Florida	37	56	19
Illinois (80–92)	36	43	07
Indiana (76–92)	44	49	05
Massachusetts	37	53	16
Michigan	39	53	14
New Hampshire	40	55	15
Ohio	37	48	11
Penn. (80–92)	35	43	08
Wisconsin	44	49	05

Source: Exit Polls 1976 provided by the Roper Center, at the University of Connecticut from CBS/*New York Times*. Exit Polls 1996 from AllPolitics website from CNN Exit Polls.

Table C: Decrease in Moderate Identifiers in GOP Primaries, 1976–1996

State	1976	1996	% Decrease
California	45	35	10
Florida	53	34	19
Illinois (80–92)	49	44	05
Indiana (76–92)	46	39	07
Massachusetts	50	35	15
Michigan	54	33	21
New Hampshire	44	35	09
Ohio	51	40	11
Penn. (80–92)	56	41	15
Wisconsin	44	36	08

Source: Exit Polls 1976 provided by the Roper Center, at the University of Connecticut from CBS/*New York Times*. Exit Polls 1996 from AllPolitics website from CNN Exit Polls.

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Table D: Self-Identified Members and Non-Members of the Religious Right as a Percentage of 1996 GOP Primary Voters

	Members	Non-Members
State		
Arizona	29	66
California	26	70
Colorado	31	65
Connecticut	16	81
Delaware	22	75
Florida	32	64
Georgia	36	61
Maine	27	69
Maryland	28	68
Massachusetts	15	80
Michigan	29	65
Mississippi	54	39
New Hampshire	17	80
New York	19	77
North Dakota	24	71
Ohio	26	66
Oklahoma	40	55
Oregon	36	59
Rhode Island	18	78
South Carolina	36	61
South Dakota	30	62
Tennessee	46	48
Texas	37	59
Vermont	16	79
Washington	32	64
Wisconsin	27	67

Source: AllPolitics website at www.allpolitics.com from CNN Exit Polls.

Table E: Participation of Well Educated Democratic Voters in the 1992 Primaries and General Election

	% of Primary Voters with a College Degree/ Post Grad Degree	% of General Election Voters with a College Degree/ Post Grad Degree	% of College Graduates/Post Graduates in the VAP (Census data)
State			
Alabama	35	n/a	15.6
California	45	43	23.4
Colorado	45	n/a	27
Connecticut	52	45	27.2
Florida	37	42	18.3
Georgia	39	37	19.3
Illinois	37	36	21.3
Indiana	28	n/a	15.6
Kansas	33	n/a	21.1
Louisiana	27	n/a	16.1
Maryland	48	49	26.5
Massachusetts	52	n/a	27.2
Michigan	35	31	17.3
Mississippi	30	n/a	14.8
New Hampshire	50	n/a	24.3
New York	55	46	23.1
North Carolina	43	39	17.4
Ohio	24	31	17
Oklahoma	26	n/a	17.8
Oregon	35	39	20.6
Pennsylvania	35	33	17.9
Rhode Island	49	n/a	21.3
South Carolina	37	n/a	16.6
South Dakota	29	n/a	17.2
Tennessee	28	n/a	15.9
Texas	32	42	20.4
Wisconsin	32	n/a	17.7

Source: Exit Polls—1992 Primary data and General Election data provided by Voter News Service from CNN Exit Polls. *Census Data:* From U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1995. *Note:* The census data are the percentages of persons age 25 and over who have completed four years of college or more. They are taken from the Decennial Census in 1990.

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Table F: Participation of Well Educated Republican Voters in the 1996 Primaries and General election

	% of Primary Voters with a College Degree/ Post Grad Degree	% of General Election Voters with a College Degree/ Post Grad Degree	% of College Graduates/Post Graduates in the VAP (Census data)
State			
Arizona	44	n/a	20.3
California	50	46	23.4
Colorado	54	n/a	27
Connecticut	62	47	27.2
Delaware	58	n/a	21.4
Florida	43	39	18.3
Georgia	46	42	19.3
Maine	49	37	18.8
Maryland	52	n/a	26.5
Massachusetts	56	53	27.2
Michigan	44	36	17.3
Mississippi	41	n/a	14.8
New Hampshire	53	52	24.3
New York	53	50	23.1
North Dakota	27	n/a	18
Ohio	40	37	17
Oklahoma	43	n/a	17.8
Oregon	25	34	20.6
Rhode Island	59	n/a	21.3
South Carolina	50	n/a	16.6
South Dakota	39	n/a	17.2
Tennessee	42	36	15.9
Texas	50	40	20.4
Vermont	51	n/a	24.3
Washington	49	37	22.9
Wisconsin	40	37	17.7

Source: Exit Polls—1996 Primary data from AllPolitics website from CNN Exit Polls and General Election data provided by Voter News Service from CNN Exit Polls. *Census Data:* From U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1995. *Note:* The census data are the percentages of persons age 25 and over who have completed four years of college or more.They are taken from the Decennial Census in 1990.

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Table G: Ratio of Primary Voters with Less Than a High School Diploma to Their Presence in the Voting Age Population — Democratic Primaries

	1976		1980		1984		1988		1992	
	Ratio		Ratio		Ratio		Ratio		Ratio	
State										
California	.5	13/26	.56	15/27	.3	8/27	.22	6/27	.29	7/24
Florida	.4	14/35	.45	14/31	.39	12/31	.23	7/31	.31	8/26
Illinois (80–92)	.44	15/34	.5	17/34	.41	14/34	.26	9/34	.29	7/24
Indiana (76–92)	.76	25/33	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	.24	8/34	.42	10/24
Massachusetts	.36	10/28	.32	9/28	.21	6/28	.21	6/28	.25	5/20
Michigan	.68	21/31	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	.39	9/23
New Hampshire	.33	10/30	.29	8/28	.21	6/28	.14	4/28	.28	5/18
New York	.35	12/34	.44	15/34	.29	10/34	.21	7/34	.2	5/25
Ohio	.47	15/32	.45	15/33	.42	14/33	.33	11/33	.33	8/24
Penn. (80–92)	.49	17/35	.49	17/35	.37	13/35	.29	10/35	.28	7/25
Wisconsin	.53	16/30	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	.23	7/30	.33	7/21

Note: Ratios of over 1.0 indicate that the group is overrepresented in the electorate. Ratios of under 1.0 indicate that the group is underrepresented in the electorate.

Sources: *Exit Poll Data:* 1976 and 1980 provided by The Roper Center, at the University of Connecticut from CBS/NYT Exit Polls. 1984 and 1988 from The 84 Vote and The 88 Vote. ABC News. 1992 provided by Voter News Service from CNN Exit Polls. *Census Data:* 1976 data: No.235, Years of School Completed, by states: 1976. U.S. Bureau of the Census, unpublished data. Statistical Abstract of the United States. 1980, 1984, and 1988 data: Years of school completed by persons age 25 and over, by State: April 1980. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1986. 1992 data: Educational attainment of persons 25 years old and over, by state: April 1990. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1995.

Table H: Ratio of Union Households as a Percentage of Primary Voters to Union Members as a Percentage of the Workforce—Democratic Primaries

	1976		1980		1984		1992	
	Ratio		Ratio		Ratio		Ratio	
State								
California	1.56	37/23.7	1.96	43/21.9	1.6	35/21.9	1.8	33/18.3
Florida	2.56	30/11.7	n/a	n/a	2.35	24/10.2	1.61	14/8.7
Illinois (80–92)	1.43	45/31.5	2.23	54/24.2	1.65	40/24.2	1.1	23/21
Indiana (76–92)	1.67	49/29.3	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	1.81	35/19.3
Massachusetts	1.48	36/24.4	1.69	40/23.7	1.22	29/23.7	1.2	21/17.5
Michigan	1.85	64/34.6	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	1.34	33/24.7
New Hampshire	1.8	24/13.3	n/a	n/a	2.17	25/11.5	1.55	18/11.6
New York	1.28	50/39.2	1.6	52/32.5	1.51	49/32.5	.96	28/29.2
Ohio	1.69	50/29.5	1.75	44/25.1	1.87	47/25.1	1.88	39/20.7
Penn. (80–92)	1.49	51/34.2	1.78	49/27.5	1.78	49/27.5	1.97	40/20.3
Wisconsin	1.62	45/27.8	1.89	45/23.8	n/a	n/a	1.67	35/20.9

Note: Ratios of over 1.0 indicate that the group is overrepresented in the electorate. Ratios of under 1.0 indicate that the group is underrepresented in the electorate.

Sources: Exit Poll Data: 1976 and 1980 provided by The Roper Center, at the University of Connecticut from CBS/NYT Exit Polls. 1984 from The 84 Vote. ABC News. 1992 provided by Voter News Service from CNN Exit Polls. Note: We did not include 1988 data because the placement of the union household question yielded an artificially low response.

Source: Union Membership Data 1978 from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Directory of National Unions and Employee Associations, 1979. Statistical Abstract fo the United States, 1979. 1983 and 1991 from Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Washington, D.C. Union Membership and Earnings Data Book: Compilations from the Current Population Survey. Copyright BNA Plus.

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Editor's note: The preceding article uses data from exit polls over the past two decades. Questions have been raised about whether they systematically overstate the participation of better-educated voters. The analysis below, prepared for **Blueprint,** concludes that exit polls are at least as reliable as any other election survey.

Who Votes?

Samuel L. Popkin and Michael P. McDonald

It is important to ask how valid the Voter Research and Surveys (VRS) exit polls are as a snapshot of the electorate. In particular, are less educated voters under-represented on exit polls or do they actually vote at substantially lower rates than college educated voters?

An alternative to VRS, which is conducted for the television networks, is the survey done each election year to supplement the Bureau of Labor Statistics Current Population Survey (CPS).[1] In this case there is clearly no reason to believe that the VRS is more biased than the CPS. The arguments against relying on the exit polls are overstated, even as there are serious measurement problems with the CPS.

Table 1 presents data from 1996 from the CPS and VRS, as well as from the National Election Study (NES), the most important academic source of voting data. No matter which source one uses, voters are markedly upscale compared with the general citizenry. Sixteen percent of all non-institutionalized citizens over 18 do not have a high school degree, while less than seven percent have advanced postgraduate degrees in the CPS. Yet, the turnout rate differences are so large that there are at least as many voters with postgraduate degrees as there are without high school degrees. The only question is how much of a tilt toward the upscale there actually is.

The VRS does produce a picture with more college-educated voters than the CPS. The CPS electorate is 41% high school education or less; the VRS only 30%. The CPS electorate is 29% college or postgraduate degrees, the VRS 43% — differences well beyond expected sampling variation. The CPS electorate has four persons with high school or less for every three college graduates, while the VRS electorate has three persons with high school or less for every four college graduates. While the VRS probably has some overstatement of educated voters, much of the difference between the two sources is not bad exit poll sampling, but a difference in question wording. Furthermore, part of the difference is due to CPS measurement errors which cause the CPS to understate the number of educated voters.

The exit polls use different education categories than NES or CPS. Approximately seven percent of the electorate has associate degrees, but the exit polls have no associate degree category. Some of the difference is because some associate degree holders check the college degree category on the exits.[2] The differences in turnout rates between less and more educated Americans are so large that the upscale slant to the electorate is not a result of bad sampling on exit polls.

CPS also has its own measurement problems. While no one seriously challenges the quality of the CPS sample, its voting questions are subject to error due to a social desirability bias. In 1992, for example, 104.4 million votes were actually cast for president and a total of 105.8 million voters overall. But the CPS reported the number of voters, based on recollections in the home, was 113.9 million votes. In 1996, the actual number of votes for president was 96.3 million, with 97.8 million voters overall, while the number of CPS-reported voters was 105 million. Thus in 1992 the CPS turnout rate was 67.7% and in 1996, 61.2%, while the actual rates were 62.8% and 54.3%.[3] One out of twelve CPS voters is a false-positive — someone who claimed to vote but did not.

The measurement error that inflates the CPS turnout biases the CPS towards overstating the number of less educated voters. It is true that the more educated a non-voter is, the more likely that non-voter is to say he or she voted. Paradoxically, the CPS overstates the proportion of less-educated voters. The net effect of false voting claims depends on two numbers: The proportion of a group that did not vote and the likelihood that any given non-voter might falsely report voting.

Reported and validated voting rates vary from under 30% for high school dropouts to over 70% among the best educated. There are so many more actual non-voters among less-educated citizens that the net effect of false voting reports is to increase the proportion of less-educated voters in the sample.

Two sources of data address the problems caused by over-reporting. From 1984 to 1988, the NES attempted to verify whether every single respondent voted by going back to the voting records after the election. Combining the data from 1984 and 1988 shows that the net proportion of each education category that falsely reported voting is almost the same. This means that while an educated non-voter is more likely to claim a vote than an uneducated non-voter, the total effect of the desirability bias is to inflate the proportion of less-educated voters.

Second, there is a way to measure social desirability bias on the CPS itself. This shows that the bias is high enough among the less-educated to inflate their proportion of the CPS electorate. For approximately half the persons the CPS reports, the data are reported not by the respondent, but by some other member of the house-

Samuel L. Popkin is a Professor of Political Science at the University of California San Diego and Director of the University's Washington program. Michael P. McDonald received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California San Diego and is a post-doctoral fellow at the Harvard University Data Program.

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hold. Because respondents are more likely to give the socially approved but incorrect answer for themselves than for others, we can again determine whether it is true that the less educated make fewer false voting claims.

In 1996, self-reporters claimed to have voted at a rate of 64%, while persons whose vote was reported by someone else voted at a rate of 57%. In 1992, 70% of self-reporters said they voted, while they reported a turnout rate of 65% for the rest of their household. Comparing self-reports and other-reports by education level, it turns out that there is slightly more bias among less-educated voters than among the educated. If so, and given the larger pool of less-educated non-voters, the CPS actually over-reports the electorate proportion in the lower turnout non-college categories.[4] That means that the true proportion of college graduates, among actual voters, while less than the VRS's 43%, is also greater than the CPS's 29%.

Comparing the CPS, NES and VRS, in fact, the differences in electorate composition on age, race, sex, and income are minimal, particulary on income. These small differences cast doubt that the VRS is not representative of the electorate. This does strengthen the case that the exit poll samples are representative of voters. How can a sample be substantially more educated without being either an older or richer one?

Differences between exits and CPS on a number of characteristics might make it more plausible that the exit samples are decidedly off. The opposite is the case: In the exit polls for 1996, 39.5% had family incomes greater than $50,000; on the CPS the comparable number was 40.4%; on the exit polls Blacks and Hispanics were 10.1% and 4.5%, and on the CPS, 10.6% and 4.7%.

Filling out an exit poll is much easier than negotiating the actual ballot. So exit poll bias against less-educated voters that does not already exist in voting has always been problematic. The most plausible conclusion is that the less-educated voters are being heard on the exit polls, their educational attainments are filtered through a different set of education categories. The differences between the electorate, as reported in exit polls, and the general citizenry, as reported in the Census, are true differences — not the artifact of biased exit polls.

Finally, while we may argue about actual percentages of more and less educated citizens who turn out to vote in any given year, no one doubts the exit poll finding that the percentage of more educated voters has steadily increased during the past generation. Given the increase in college graduates as a share of the voting-age population, this is exactly what we would expect.

Table 1

1996 Electorate	CPS All	CPS Voters	NES All	NES Voters	VRS Voters
Age					
18-29	22.0	14.9	16.9	11.5	17.1
30-44	32.6	31.8	39.4	39.4	32.9
45-59	23.1	26.5	21.6	23.6	28.3
60 +	22.3	26.7	22.1	25.5	23.7
Race					
White	79.2	82.5	78.4	82.1	83.0
Black	11.7	10.6	11.4	9.5	10.1
Hispanic	6.2	4.7	7.1	5.5	4.5
Asian	2.1	1.6	1.9	1.9	1.1
Other	0.8	0.6	1.2	1.0	1.3
Sex					
Male	47.7	46.6	47.9	46.0	47.9
Female	52.3	53.4	52.1	52.0	52.1
Education					
No HS Degree	16.2	10.7	12.5	8.7	6.3
High School	34.4	30.5	31.6	27.2	23.6
Some College	20.0	21.2	18.8	22.2	27.1
Associate Degree	7.1	8.2	9.1	9.7	
College Graduate	15.2	19.3	18.6	22.2	25.6
Post Graduate	7.1	10.1	9.9	12.5	17.4
Income					
< $15,000	19.1	14.3	16.5	13.6	11.4
$15,000–$29,999	22.3	19.9	20.9	19.9	22.7
$30,000–$49,999	25.1	25.4	25.6	25.0	27.4
$50,000–$74,999	18.6	21.2	19.7	23.1	20.6
$75,000 +	15.1	19.2	15.3	18.4	17.9

Endnotes

[1] Ruy Teixeira has argued that the CPS is a more accurate source because, "Exit Polls overcount better educated voters. Evidently, college educated voters are more articulate and more willing to cooperate with exit polls, which accounts for their overrepresentation." "Who Deserted the Democrats in 1994?" Ruy A. Teixeira and Joel Rogers. The American Prospect 23, Fall 1995, 74.

[2] Teixeira has argued that only sampling error could explain this many educated voters; a turnout rate greater than 100% would be required otherwise to have such a high proportion of degree holders. "The Real Electorate," The American Prospect 37, March/April 1998, 83. He has ignored the difference in questions and the fact that associate degree holders might place themselves in the degree holding category.

[3] Election Data Services compiles the total number of voters for the Congressional Research Service. For 40 states the total number of voters includes an actual count of the ballots cast, including spoiled and invalid ballots; for ten states, the total is the largest number of votes for any race on the ballot. The number of eligible voters is used to calculate the rates of the CPS number of citizens aged 18 and older. Note that CPS figures sometimes show a lower turnout rate because the denominator includes non-citizens. If non-citizens are included the turnout rates for 1992 and 1996 would be 57% and 50.6%.

[4] Teixeira has argued that over-reporting inflated the proportion of the educated in the electorate because, "The census could overstate the fraction of non-college educated people in the electorate only if lower-education respondents were more likely to over-report voting." (1998, p.83). This is incorrect; the effect of overreporting depends on both the probability of a non-voter remembering a vote and the proportion of a group that did not vote.

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The Active Center Holds

BY MARK J. PENN

It's full speed ahead — to an active center. With Democrats and Independent voters moving decisively toward the center — and with Republicans continuing to move toward the right — the opportunity exists to create a powerful constituency for a Third Way in American politics.

That is the conclusion of a new survey, conducted July 30-August 2, 1998, of 1,400 voters nationwide. The survey makes clear that the electorate continues to be in a period of ideological transformation. Thus far, that transformation is moving toward a politics that favors the New Democrat philosophy — an active but limited government that gives people the tools to succeed. Over the past couple of decades — and even over the past year — Democrats and Independents have moved towards this approach, as many Republicans are abandoning the center and separating themselves from their party's moderates. By ceding the center and hunkering down in what is increasingly seen as an ideologically extreme position, the Republican Party is giving Democrats a golden opportunity — the test will be in whether Democrats continue to advocate the principles that have enabled them to make progress at the national level in recent years.

The highlights of this survey have important implications for American politics as we enter the next century:

1. Democrats are increasingly New Democrats.

Through self-identification and the choice of whom they most trust to govern, Democrats today are decisively moving away from traditional liberalism and toward a New Democratic center. The philosophy of Democrats has evolved: no more than a third of Democrats support a clearly liberal position compared to a centrist one on the issues which voters rank as most important. Furthermore, the entire electorate gives moderate Democrats a decided advantage when it comes to these issues.

2. Support is growing for a limited role of government.

Over the past 25 years, voters have increasingly come to believe in a more limited role of government. This view is based on a priority for fiscal responsibility and an emphasis on government that expands opportunity, not bureaucracy.

Mark J. Penn is president of Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates, Inc. and the pollster to President Clinton and Vice President Gore. Research and polling assistance provided by Jenifer Coleman.

Full results of this poll can be found at www.dlc.org/blueprint/fall/98/poll.html

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3. On major current issues, a Third Way constituency controls the debate.

When given a choice on how to address the most significant issues of the day, Democrats choose a Third Way approach, especially on big challenges such as welfare reform, the cities, and the budget.

4. On 21st Century issues, New Democrat approaches lead.

New Democrats are regarded as well positioned to lead on many of the issues that will help shape the politics of the next century — including those associated with the New Economy, advances in science and technology, an increasingly elderly population, and an increasingly diverse society. Significantly, Democrats are now more likely to support increased global trade than other voters.

5. The electoral forces of the future are New Democrat in their outlook.

Wired workers, representative of economic change, and Generation Xers, representative of generational change, will help define the politics of the next century. They are looking for something other than old choices.

6. New Democrat policies are playing a major role in maintaining President Clinton's popularity.

President Clinton is seen by the public as a New Democrat. The public embraces the President's consistent push for alternatives to the old left and right solutions. Voters who support this Third Way approach give President Clinton his highest approval ratings.

7. A closer look at a changed party.

For the second year in a row, we have segmented the electorate to provide a deeper understanding of which voters embrace the center. This year, new demographic data round out the picture of the transformation within the Democratic Party.

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1. Democrats: A Party of The Center

A New Democrat has the advantage.

The old platitude that Democrats had to run to the left in the primaries to placate their base is contradicted by the realization that there is a new Democratic Party rank-and-file. Today, in both the party itself and the electorate at large, the predisposition is to look for leadership to Democrats of the center.

Based on multiple factors, including self-identification and choice of philosophy, the centrism of the Democratic Party is evident. Thirty-six percent of today's Democrats say they are moderates — as opposed to the 34 percent who call themselves liberals and 18 percent who are conservatives.

Sixty-four percent of Independents look toward the center for solutions — with only nine percent looking to the right and only seven percent looking to the left. Together this new Democratic Party and centrist Independent force forms an active center of American politics with the power to bring victory to candidates that reflect their views.

Ideology of All Voters



Ideology of Republicans

Ideology of Independents



Ideology of Democrats



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Trust on the issues

A year ago, our polling showed that the Democratic Party had become a New Democrat Party. This year, our polling shows a predisposition in the electorate at-large to support New Democrats and their positions — even if they don't refer to them by that name. When it comes to the issues that concern them most, voters would trust a moderate Democrat more than any other Democrat or Republican on every issue except high taxes — and there a moderate Democrat and a conservative Republican tie.

Table 1

In each of these areas, do you think you would have more confidence in a conservative Republican, a moderate Republican, a moderate Democrat, or a liberal Democrat to handle the issue?	*Greatest Concern	Liberal Democrat	Moderate Democrat	Moderate Republican	Conservative Republican
The weakening of traditional family values	20	11	30	19	26
Preserving Medicare and Social Security for the future	15	19	32	17	19
The need for better and safer schools	15	11	36	18	21
Crime and violence	14	11	31	18	26
Finding good jobs and economic opportunity	7	17	31	22	17
High government spending	6	8	30	20	29
High taxes	5	12	28	17	28
The need for a cleaner environment	5	21	36	15	15
Emerging new issues around the role of science, technology and genetics	4	17	25	21	17
Addressing the problem of income inequality	3	18	32	20	15
America's competitiveness in the world economy	3	8	28	25	23

** I am going to read you a list of some concerns that some people have expressed about aspects of life in America. Please tell me which of these is of greatest concern to you?*

Even among Democrats alone, when given the choice between a moderate and a liberal, at most 31 percent of Democrats chose the liberal Democrat – and even then it was on issues of income inequality and the environment that have been seen as the territory of more traditional liberals.

There is no call for liberalism on any of the four issues ranked as most important by all voters. On these central issues, liberal Democrats receive their highest ratings when it comes to preserving Medicare and Social Security. Still,

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even there, by a ratio of more than 2-to-1, Democrats would choose a moderate Democrat. Most striking of all is the huge advantage for moderate Democrats on the issue of education, where all Democrats are increasingly embracing reforms to the public school system.

Table 2

Who Democrats trust to handle their top four greatest concerns:	Liberal Democrat	Moderate Democrat	Moderate Advantage
The weakening of traditional family values	19	55	36
Preserving Medicare and Social Security for the future	27	56	29
The need for better and safer schools	13	65	52
Crime and violence	17	53	36

The conservative trend of Republicans

Where once Democrats were seen as the party whose voters were more likely to impose extreme ideological litmus tests, today it is the Republicans who have been captured by a conservative fundamentalism. While Democratic voters are looking toward the center by substantial majorities, Republican voters are heading in the opposite direction — choosing conservatives over moderates. Fifty-seven percent of Republicans identify themselves as conservative. As a result, Republican voters put their trust in a conservative candidate.

Table 3

Who Republicans trust to handle their top four greatest concerns:	Conservative Republican	Moderate Republican	Conservative Advantage
The weakening of traditional family values	50	32	18
Preserving Medicare and Social Security for the future	40	33	87
The need for better and safer schools	47	27	20
Crime and violence	54	28	26

If they continue to move beyond the mainstream of what Americans want from their government, Republicans will place themselves out of contention in national elections — but only if Democrats step into the breech and provide Americans with the type of new centrist thinking they clearly have demanded.

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2. Less is More: A 25 Year Shift in Attitudes About The Role of Government

Tracking questions about the role of government asked in past national polls provide a snapshot of generational change: In 1973, a Harris national poll found that 32 percent of respondents agreed with the statement "the best government is the government that governs the least," while 56 percent disagreed[1]. Twenty-five years later the views have flipped – now 56 percent agree and 36 percent disagree. Significantly, in 1973, 26 percent of Democrats agreed, 62 percent disagreed. Today, 39 percent of Democrats agree, 51 percent disagree — an increase of 13 percent in the number of Democrats who hold this limited view.

Do you agree or disagree: The best government is the government that governs the least?



While the change over 25 years must take into account underlying social, historical, and economic factors, the reality of an electorate with fundamentally different views on the role of government must be accepted. Pundits on the left criticize the Democratic leadership — in particular, the White House — for failing to capitalize on a perceived mandate to reinvigorate big government. But those advocates refuse to acknowledge that the attitudes of the nation are drastically different from the time period they seek to revive. The liberalism of big spending and big programs is gone. Voters, including Democrats, do not believe the role of government is to redistribute existing wealth or freely spend on social programs. Instead, voters overwhelmingly prefer a government that focuses on "spurring economic growth and creating opportunity for all Americans."

Table 4

Do you think the role of government is to:	All	Democrats	Republicans	Independents
Redistribute existing wealth	14	17	13	14
Foster conditions that enable everyone to have a chance to make a higher income	78	77	77	81

1. Harris Poll: Confidence and Concern: Citizens view of American Government, A Survey of Public Attitudes by the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, Conducted by Louis Harris and Associates, October 3, 1973, page 116

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Table 5

Which of the following is closest to your own thinking about the proper role of the government in terms of economics?	All	Democrats	Republicans	Independents
Government should spend on social programs where necessary, because America is not about leaving every one to fend for himself	16	21	10	16
Government should focus on spurring economic growth and creating opportunity for all Americans	60	64	57	58
Government should stay out of the economy altogether so private forces can compete and create jobs	21	12	30	21

Americans also have a view of the proper role of government action that is fundamentally different from the two choices they were being offered for so long. They reject both a "nanny state" and a "dead-beat dad state." Instead, they look to government as a force that can empower people "to solve their own problems."

Table 6

Which of the following is closest to your own thinking about the proper role of the federal government?	All	Democrats	Republicans	Independents
Government should solve problems and protect people from adversity	12	17	9	11
Government should help people equip themselves to solve their own problems	50	54	49	48
Government should stay out of people's lives so they can solve their problems without interference or regulation	35	26	42	38

There is evidence that, even over the past year, there has been a slight increase in the percentage of voters looking toward the New Democrat philosophy of opportunity. Voters in 1997 and 1998 have seen the effectiveness of a balanced budget, welfare reform, and an invest-and-grow economic strategy. Since a similar poll in July 1997, the percentage of voters saying the role of government should be to "foster conditions that enable everyone to have a chance to make a higher income" has increased from 71 percent to 78 percent. Conversely, the percentage who believe in a redistributionist role of government dropped from 22 percent to 14 percent.

As the New Economy has taken hold and its implications have become evident to more Americans, they have become even more convinced that neither of the old positions about social policy has it right. Voters overwhelmingly, and increasingly, prefer a government that focuses on "spurring economic growth and creating opportunity for all Americans" — as opposed to both the liberal choice of tax and spend and the conservative choice of having the government stay out of the economy altogether.

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Table 7

Which of the following is closest to your thinking about the proper role of the government in terms of economics?	1998	1964
Government should spend on social programs where necessary, because America is not about leaving everyone to fend for himself	16	17
Government should focus on spurring economic growth and creating opportunity for all Americans	60	56
Government should stay out of the economy altogether so private forces can compete and create jobs	21	24

3. The Third Way

When it comes to a basket of key social and fiscal issues — including welfare, the federal budget, the cities, and healthcare — Democrats have made their choice: they're demanding a Third Way that moves past the old orthodoxies and offers new options.

The Budget: Now that they have seen the impact of a settled national deficit situation, Americans place a premium on fiscal responsibility. They reject as extreme both of two alternatives — deficit spending or reckless tax cuts.

Table 8

Which is closest to your view on how the budget should be handled as we enter the 21st century?	All	Democrats	Republicans	Independents
If programs such as education and healthcare need more funding we should invest in these areas even if it means deficit spending	11	16	8	9
We should work to maintain a balanced budget consistent with our values–investing more in education, Medicare and the environment–to the extent we can also keep the budget balanced.	63	66	57	62
Make cutting government spending and lowering taxes the highest priority	25	16	34	27

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Welfare: Another clear indication of the resonance of the Third Way is the predominant view on welfare. Only 12 percent (15 percent of Democrats) say the poor need to be protected by a safety net and an even smaller percentage want the poor to fend for themselves. The success of the Welfare Reform Act and welfare-to-work programs has clearly proven to voters that giving the underprivileged opportunities to change their situation is a better alternative than either protecting them or leaving them to fend for themselves.

Table 9

Which is closest to your view?	All	Democrats	Republicans	Independents
The poor in this country need to be protected by a safety net and that need is growing	12	15	7	13
Welfare must be replaced with an employment system so that welfare recipients develop an attachment to the workforce and can become independent	77	77	79	74
The welfare and workfare system is a drain on the U.S. budget and the economy and should be eliminated period.	9	7	11	10

Healthcare: With significant healthcare legislation under debate in Congress in 1994, 1996, and 1998, Americans have come to some conclusions regarding what they want government to do in this field. Once again, they choose a Third Way that employs government action to help the free market work better.

Table 10

Which is closest to your view on how the government should handle healthcare reform?	All	Democrats	Republicans	Independents
Government should assure universal access to healthcare even if that means new government programs	22	26	14	22
Government should not manage healthcare, but set the basic rules so that everyone receives emergency care and so that patients are treated fairly by HMOs	60	61	58	60
The government should not be involved in regulating our healthcare	17	10	26	16

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Cities: Both Democrats and the general public have accepted that the cities cannot be abandoned by either the government or the private sector — that both must work in concert if America's urban areas are to be given a new lease on life.

Table 11

Which do you think is the better way to ensure the prosperity of American cities in the 21st century?	All	Democrats	Republicans	Independents
Increase spending on low income housing and rebuilding poor areas	20	27	12	18
Encourage public-private partnerships to invest in cities and bring new businesses to poor areas	54	53	52	56
The government should play as little a role as possible, and leave investment to businesses and individuals	22	15	31	21

4. Issues of a New Era

New issues are coming to the forefront of the public debate. On many of these issues Democrats, and especially New Democrats, have a distinct advantage.

The Global Economy — The Parties Switch Sides

Trade: Americans understand that the global economy has produced both winners and losers. Sixty-three percent think that expanding free trade is both helpful to the economic growth of the country and detrimental to American workers.

As a result, there is no strong consensus on how to handle trade policy. But, as with other policies, the traditional lines along which views are formed have softened. Union members — once seen as the largest forces against trade — now support trade at levels comparable to the rest of the nation. As the composition and ideological positions of the parties shift, it is Democrats, more than other voters, who now form the core constituency for trade.

Where Republicans would prefer to limit any new trade agreements and put primary emphasis on protecting America from foreign competition instead of encouraging free trade and helping dislocated workers (by a margin of 45 percent to 38 percent), Democrats hold the reverse position (by a margin of 51 percent to 37 percent). The Republicans are now the most protectionist segment of the electorate, while the Democrats are the most pro-trade.

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Table 12

Which is closest to your view on what America's trade policy should be?	All	Democrats	Republicans	Independents
The government should limit any new trade agreements and put its primary emphasis on protecting American workers, and in some cases American industries, from foreign competition	42	37	45	44
The government should open up new markets, encouraging expanded free trade, and help any dislocated workers move into newer, growing industries	44	51	38	43
The government should open up new markets, expanding free trade, but not make any special effort to help workers dislocated as a result of this policy	8	8	12	7

If there is a silver lining in the Asian economic crisis, it might be that it has helped convince Americans of our increasing global interdependence. Across party lines more than two-thirds of voters believe that the U.S. economy will feel significant effects from the Asian market collapse.

But when it comes to dealing with this evident challenge, Republicans show themselves to be neo-isolationist, while Democrats are willing to make the global economy work. Respondents were given two options. One argued that trying to reform the Asian economies will end up spending U.S. funds for our competitors. The second argued that getting involved in such reforms will have long-run benefits in boosting exports and creating more jobs at home. After hearing the second argument, Democrats chose to get involved (54 percent to 40 percent), while Republicans chose to stay away (65 percent to 33 percent).

Similarly, Democrats are more supportive of participating in International Monetary Fund efforts to reform the Asian economies. Fifty-two percent of Democrats say that we should get involved in reforming these economies because it will help prevent problems here. Only 40 percent of Republicans agree.

These issues reveal the crosscurrents of party ideology at this time. Those most supportive of involvement in the global economy are upper-income, well-educated voters. This means that, on this issue, this key block of the electorate will feel more at home in a Democratic Party that embraces the global economy and is willing to make it work, than in an increasingly isolationist Republican Party.

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The Information Age

Worker training: With technological advances developing at such a rapid pace, worker training is providing another arena for debate on the appropriate level of government activity. Here again, voters do not turn to government spending alone to provide solutions. While a majority (55 percent) see a role for the federal government in ensuring workers have essential training, only a small majority think the government should increase funding for job training programs (11 percent, 18 percent of Democrats).

Instead, Democrats and Independents are more likely to say the government should reform and improve job training by giving workers skill grants to update their skills (44 percent overall, 43 percent of Democrats, 51 percent of Independents), while Republicans tend to say the government should not get involved and competition in the workforce is enough to ensure that American workers are receiving training (41 percent overall, 61 percent of Republicans).

An Aging America

Caring for the elderly: One of the most significant changes the country will face in the 21st century is the aging of the baby boom generation. The debate over how the government should handle this demographic change will become ever more important. Voters maintain their preference for the New Democratic idea that government should provide means and tools through which families and individuals can better handle the challenge of the aging population. However, they reject the notion that the way to care for the elderly is to expand government programs:

- 18 percent support expanding government-run programs to care for the elderly
- 42 percent think the government should give families the tools to help care for the elderly, such as a tax credit for caring for the elderly
- 36 percent say giving tax cuts to the elderly to allow them to pay for their own expenses or needs will be sufficient

Social Security: At the intersection of the New Economy and America's aging population lies the burning question of Social Security reform. As this national debate picks up steam, a Third Way approach is seen as the best solution by all voters — Democrats included. Sixty-one percent of Americans (60 percent of Democrats) believe the Social Security system should remain intact, but with greater flexibility to allow Americans to invest a portion of their retirement savings in the market.

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Table 13

Which is closer to your view on how to handle Social Security reform?	All	Democrats	Republicans	Independents
Leave the system as it is and make changes such as reducing benefits to make the trust fund last longer	17	22	15	15
Leave much of the Social Security system as it is, but make it easier for individuals to invest a portion of their payroll taxes in personal savings accounts	61	60	58	62
Privatize the entire Social Security system	15	12	18	15

Americans hold to this core belief even after the specter of a market downturn that leaves them with little retirement savings is raised.

Table 14

Some people say personal savings accounts could be risky because if the stock market takes a downturn, individuals could be left with little retirement savings, with no protection from the government. Given this, which would you prefer:	All	Democrats	Republicans	Independents
Government investment of the Social Security Trust fund in the stock market	32	38	26	30
Setting up personal savings accounts	55	44	62	59

Though Americans are eager to invest Social Security funds in the marketplace, they have some very definite ideas about who should hold the responsibility for making these decisions: the people themselves — and not the government.

Table 15

Which would you prefer:	All	Democrats	Republicans	Independents
Government investment of the Social Security Trust fund in the stock market	32	38	26	30
Setting up personal savings accounts	55	44	62	59

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Immigration

On the hot-button issue of immigration, Americans reject separatist sentiments both among recent immigrants and among those who are trying to keep them out. Instead, they believe that immigrants should be welcomed, and should also become part of the fabric of American life. Only one in four believe immigration should be limited:

Table 16

Which is closest to your view on immigration:	All	Democrats	Republicans	Independents
Immigrants who come to this country should be able to maintain their distinct ways of life	6	11	2	5
Immigrants are welcome to the United States but should be expected to live up to their responsibilities as American citizens	66	63	71	67
Immigrants are costly to taxpayers, we should limit the number of people who enter the country	24	20	24	27

5. The Electorate of the Future

This year we examined two groups of voters who will help define the electorate of the 21st century. Because of the inevitable reality of generational change, Generation X voters will become an increasingly important part in shaping the electoral map. And because of the inexorable advent of the New Economy, wired workers and their values will play a major role in defining American politics.

Generation X

The 24 percent of voters under the age of 33 have grown up in a different world than did their parents and grandparents. And their world view clearly reflects this. GenXers embrace the new philosophies of the New Economy: a demand for fiscal responsibility; support for free trade (60 percent compared to 52 percent overall) and America's involvement in reforming the Asian economies (52 percent compared to 47 percent overall); the belief that Social Security reform should include structural changes to allow more individual savings (64 percent compared to 52 percent overall); and an opposition to government regulation of the Internet (57 percent compared to 50 percent overall). For 23 percent, better and safer schools are their area of greatest concern — as opposed to 15 percent of all voters.

They are more socially liberal than voters overall: they more readily accept homosexuality (41 percent believe the government should allow gay marriages compared to 27 percent overall); are more amenable to immigrants (77 percent chose the liberal or moderate view compared to 72 percent overall); and support investment in urban areas (81 percent chose the liberal or moderate view compared to 74 percent overall).

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At the same time, these voters are favorable towards more centrist approaches on issues such as gun control (51 percent compared to 46 percent overall); affirmative action (37 percent compared to 32 percent overall); and even the environment (45 percent compared to 43 percent overall).

Wired Workers

Wired workers, those Americans who work with a computer in a flexible, teamwork-oriented environment, are the big constituency of the future.

More than any other group, wired workers embrace the Information Age ideology of the Third Way because it reflects the world they are living and working in daily. For them, the best government is one that is limited, but not absentee altogether. For instance, they believe that government should equip parents to handle regulation of the Internet — neither imposing regulations itself nor removing itself from its obligations (53 percent compared to 47 percent overall). They consider market incentives the best way to protect the environment without over-regulating the economy (48 percent compared to 43 percent overall). They think the best way to revitalize cities is to develop public-private partnerships to rebuild poor areas — not to simply pour government money into urban cores nor to abandon them (63 percent compared to 54 percent overall).

Wired workers, a fifth of the electorate, also embrace the future of the global economy. They support expanding free trade agreements (51 percent compared to 44 percent overall) and U.S. involvement with the International Monetary Fund (53 percent compared to 47 percent overall). Wired workers are also more open to structural changes in Social Security, including individual savings accounts (66 percent compared to 52 percent overall).

Finally, the voting tendencies of wired workers reveal that, along with embracing the Third Way, they are searching for leaders who can move past the old choices. And they reward leaders who do so. Sixty-five percent of wired workers say the country is on the right track (compared to 51 percent overall), and 73 percent approve of the job President Clinton is doing (compared to 68 percent overall).

They are up for grabs and waiting for results. In the upcoming Congressional election, 30 percent say they still don't know if they will vote for a Democrat or Republican (compared to 25 percent overall).

Wired workers tend to be between the ages of 25 and 49 (71 percent compared to 46 percent overall) and have a college degree or higher (53 percent compared to 34 percent overall). They tend to be married (60 percent compared to 54 percent overall) and are more likely to have children than the population as a whole (51 percent compared to 44 percent overall). They are wealthier (46 percent report income over $50,000 compared to 28 percent overall) and more likely to work in professional occupations like management (40 percent compared to 28 percent overall). They disproportionately live in suburban areas (27 percent compared to 16 percent overall) and are more concentrated in the Northeast (26 percent compared to 22 percent overall) and the West (27 percent compared to 22 percent overall).

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Table 17

Which is closest to your view on what America's trade policy should be?	All	Generation Xers	Wired Workers
The government should limit any new trade agreements and put its primary emphasis on protecting American workers, and in some cases American industries, from foreign competition	42	38	37
The government should open up new markets, encouraging expanded free trade and help any dislocated workers move into newer, growing industries	44	46	51
The government should open up new markets, expanding free trade, but not make any special effort to help workers dislocated as a result of this policy	8	14	9

Table 18

Do you think it would be better:	All	Generation Xers	Wired Workers
To preserve the existing Social Security program so it functions the same way it does now	42	29	29
To move toward structural changes to Social Security that depend more on private savings	52	64	66

6. President Clinton's Success

There has been much public debate about why President Clinton's job approval ratings have remained so high in the midst of the back and forth over the current investigation. Some try to explain this away by saying it is all a function of America's contentment with a booming economy. But there is more to it than that. President Clinton's policies — based on New Democratic approaches — have played a major role in sustaining him in the face of challenges to his leadership role.

There is significant evidence that Americans understand that President Clinton is a New Democrat who emphasizes innovative solutions as opposed to the traditional liberal and conservative answers. And they recognize that his policies have brought not only a strong economy, but low welfare rolls, low crime rates, and the first budget surplus in 30 years.

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President Clinton's high job approval ratings have been bolstered by the support of voters who choose the New Democrat alternative to the liberal and conservative choices. These voters approve of the job President Clinton has been doing at higher levels than their counterparts. For example, overall, President Clinton receives a 68 percent job approval rating; but among the 44 percent who agree that the best way to handle trade is to open up new markets while helping workers move into new industries, his job approval shoots up to 77 percent.

Table 19

Third Way choices on important policy issues:	Choosing Third Way overall	Approval of President Clinton among those who choose Third Way (68% approve of President Clinton overall)
Budget: We should work to maintain a balanced budget consistent with our values—investing more in education, Medicare, and the environment to the extent we can keep the budget balanced	63	73
Trade: The government should open up new markets, encouraging expanded free trade, and help any dislocated workers move into newer, growing industries	44	77
Social Security: We should save any surplus until we have guaranteed Social Security for the future	38	75
Economic Role of Government: Government should focus on spurring economic growth and creating opportunity for all Americans	60	72
Welfare: Welfare must be replaced with an employment system	77	70

Furthermore, moderate Democrats and moderate Independents approve of President Clinton at higher levels than their liberal and conservative counterparts. The difference is most striking among Independents, the vast number of voters whose support is continually up for grabs. While 69 percent of all Independents approve of President Clinton job performance, 82 percent of moderate Independents do.

The following chart makes it clear: If President Clinton had been governing as a traditional liberal instead of a New Democrat, he would not have the high level of job approval that he has maintained over the past two years. The support that has maintained his approval ratings through severe challenges has come from the mainstream, not the traditional extremes.

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Table 20

Approval of President Clinton by ideology	Democrats	Independents
Overall Approval	90	69
Liberal	88	69
Moderate	93	82
Conservative	88	61

7. A Closer Look at the New Democratic Party

As our poll findings revealed last year, today's Democratic Party is composed of five distinct groups—New Economy Democrats, Suburban Values Democrats, Pro-Government Democrats, Economic Liberals and Social Conservatives. This year, we looked at a battery of demographic information to paint a fuller picture of who these voters are.

Each segment is defined by views on a number of key issues, including the proper role of government, economic redistribution, trade, social issues, and values-oriented issues.

We found a majority of Democrats (56 percent) are inclined to support New Democrat thinking on issues of primary concern.

The Democratic Electorate



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New Economy Democrats (26 percent of Democrats)

New Economy Democrats are defined in terms of their strong support of free trade and globalization (73 percent vs. 51 percent of Democrats overall) and their view that expanded free trade is helpful to our economic growth (39 percent vs. 17 percent of Democrats). This group is the most optimistic about the direction of the country (70 percent vs. 63 percent among all Democrats) and is also are more optimistic about the economy (85 percent vs. 78 percent overall).

New Economy Democrats are less likely to consider themselves strong Democrats than are Democrats as a whole (63 percent vs. 70 percent overall). Therefore, Democrats cannot consider them an automatic part of the base, irrespective of the party's policy choices. These voters want a new thinking that corresponds with the reality of the changing world. New Economy voters are significantly more likely to choose a new Third Way option on a range of important issues, including: healthcare reform (74 percent vs. 61 percent of all Democrats); training workers for the Information Age (53 percent vs. 44 percent of Democrats); affirmative action (40 percent vs. 34 percent overall); trade policy (75 percent vs. 51 percent overall); welfare reform (85 percent vs. 77 percent overall); immigration (84 percent vs. 64 percent overall); and homosexuality (62 percent vs. 53 percent overall). New Economy Democrats are also more likely to support fundamental changes to Social Security than any other group (52 percent vs. 36 percent overall).

In some ways, New Economy Democrats are no different than other Democrats. They have the same basic racial and ethnic composition and live in the same regions of the country. While they are slightly more male than most Democrats (44 percent vs. 40 percent overall), what really sets them apart is the type of lives they lead. This group is the most likely to use a computer at work (62 percent vs. 55 percent overall). Nearly half use the Internet, versus just a third of all Democrats. The group is more likely to be white-collar professional managers (30 percent vs. 24 percent overall), the least likely to earn under $25,000 a year (16 percent vs. 22 percent), and more likely to have attended college or have graduate degrees (66 percent vs. 55 percent overall).

Suburban Values Democrats (30 percent)

Suburban Values voters are characterized by their view that better schools and safer streets are of paramount importance. They are explicitly more concerned with values issues that affect their everyday lives than with economic issues. They are almost twice as concerned about education as other Democrats (35 percent vs. 20 percent overall). They are more likely than other Democrats to say that fighting crime is the most important issue. Seventy-five percent of Suburban Values Democrats believe that the decline in values is more important than economic issues such as job creation and growth — compared to 54 percent of all Democrats who hold this view.

Suburban Values Democrats are the most likely of any group to choose the Third Way when asked to describe the role of government, either in general (72 percent vs. 54 percent overall) or in terms of economics (68 percent vs. 64 percent overall).

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A majority of Suburban Values Democrats are somewhat more likely to be women (62 percent vs. 60 percent overall), and they tend to be younger (32 percent are under 23 vs. 18 percent overall). They are 40 percent more likely than other Democrats to live in the suburbs and twice as likely to be homemakers. They are also the least likely to have a union member in their household (72 percent non-union vs. 68 percent overall).

Economic Liberals (6 percent)

Six percent of Democrats are characterized by their view that the proper role of government is to redistribute wealth and close the income gap between the wealthy and the poor (75 percent vs. 16 percent of all Democrats). They are the most likely of any segment to describe themselves as liberal (45 percent vs. 34 percent overall).

Sixty-seven percent of Economic Liberals believe that economic issues such as job creation and growth are more important than the decline in values, as compared to the 42 percent of all Democrats who believe this. They are nearly five times as likely to be concerned with the problem of income inequality (19 percent vs. 4 percent). They are also concerned with issues that are not strictly economic, but have important economic dimensions. For instance, Economic Liberals are more likely to say healthcare is the most important issue than Democrats overall (14 percent vs. 9 percent overall).

These voters also are the most likely to have no children living at home (79 percent vs. 59 percent overall), and the most likely to live in a small town (36 percent vs. 19 percent overall). Economic Liberals are also the most likely to be members of a labor union (24 percent vs. 11 percent overall).

Pro-Government Democrats (18 percent)

Pro-government Democrats are much more likely to support traditional government involvement in solving problems (45 percent vs. 16 percent of all Democrats) and spending on social programs (32 percent vs. 21 percent overall).

Pro-government Democrats are typically also more liberal on social issues. They believe that homosexuality is a private matter (61 percent vs. 53 percent overall), are pro-choice (53 percent vs. 48 percent overall), and support environmental activism (53 percent vs. 47 percent overall).

They are more likely than Democrats overall to say that the economy (26 percent vs. 21 percent overall) or healthcare (14 percent vs. 9 percent overall) is the most important issue. They are also more likely to say that preserving Medicare and Social Security for the future is their greatest concern (26 percent vs. 21 percent overall).

These voters tend to be middle-aged (32 percent are 35-49 years old vs. 27 percent overall), low to middle income earners (45 percent report income under $35,000 vs. 43 percent overall), and more female than Democrats as a whole (70 percent vs. 60 percent overall). They are also almost twice as likely to identify themselves as "extremely liberal" than are Democrats as a whole.

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Social Conservatives (20 percent)

Nearly two in ten Democrats are socially conservative on issues such as gay rights (which they strongly oppose—49 percent vs. 24 percent overall) and abortion (54 percent say that abortion is the murder of an unborn child vs. 21 percent overall). They are about twice as likely to choose the weakening of traditional family values as their top concern.

Social Conservatives are also the group most likely to support limiting trade agreements in order to protect American workers (59 percent vs. 37 percent overall). They are twice as likely as other Democrats to say that immigrants are costly to taxpayers and that immigration should be limited (54 percent vs. 23 percent overall). They are also twice as likely to say that affirmative action policies are no longer necessary and are a form of reverse discrimination (69 percent vs. 32 percent overall). In addition, they are more likely to be opposed to gun control than other groups (27 percent vs. 16 percent overall).

Social conservatives are low to middle income earners (48 percent report income under $35,000 vs. 43 percent overall) and 50 percent have a high school education or less as opposed to 37 percent overall. They tend to be older (68 percent are over 50 years old vs. 52 percent overall); married (60 percent vs. 44 percent overall); and have children at home (47 percent vs. 41 percent overall). Social Conservative are also more likely to be Protestants (56 percent vs. 39 percent), "Born Again" Christians (62 percent vs. 41 percent), and Southern Baptists (40 percent vs. 28 percent). They are more likely to live in a rural area (30 percent vs. 16 percent overall) and to live in the South (42 percent vs. 29 percent overall). This group also tends to be more male than Democrats as a whole (46 percent vs. 40 percent overall). They are more than twice as likely to plan to vote for Republicans in this fall's election (13 percent vs. 6 percent overall).

Methodology

1,400 telephone interviews of registered voters were conducted nationwide from July 30, to August 2, 1998. The margin of error is +/- 2.6% for the entire sample. Portions of the survey were split sampled. Figures for age, gender, race, party and region have been weighted when necessary to bring them into line with their actual proportions in the electorate.

Segmentation Methodology

To divide the electorate, respondents were given scores based on their answers to sets of questions falling into five defining topics to create ideological distinctions between voters. Each respondent received an individual score for each set of questions (while some sets had different numbers of questions scored, all categories were normalized to compensate). A respondent was placed in the segment in which they received the highest score.

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Table 21

The following categories were scored as defining characteristics:	High Score means	Segment of highest score in this category
Trade	Support trade and involvement in a global economy	New Economy Democrats
Economic (taxes, jobs, spending) vs. values oriented (family values, education, crime) concerns about American life	More concerned about values than economic issues	Suburban Values
Role of Government	Support government involvement	Pro-Government
Income Redistribution	Believe in income redistribution	Economic Liberals
Social Liberalism/Conservatism	Conservative on social issues	Social Conservatives

Economic vs. Values-Oriented Concerns about American life

The following questions were used to determine the Suburban Values segment: "I am going to read you a list of some concerns that some people have expressed about aspects of life in America. Please tell me which of these is of greatest concern to you" and "Which is of greater concern to you right now—economic issues such as quality jobs and lower taxes, or the decline in values and the moral fabric of society contributing to the breakup of the family and increase in crime and violence."

For the first question, concerns about better and safer schools, crime and violence, and traditional values were given higher scores, while choices concerning the economy like high taxes and income inequality were given low scores. On the second question, the first choice was given a low score and the second choice a high score.

A high score indicated that this respondent was more concerned about values issues, such as family values, crime, and education than economic issues such as taxes, employment, and income inequality.

Role of Government

The following questions were used to determine the Pro-Government Democrats segment: "Which of the following is closest to your own thinking about the proper role of the federal government?"; "Do you agree or disagree: The best government is the government that governs the least"; and "Which one of the statements listed comes closest to your own views about governmental power today?"

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Choices indicating a preference for a strong role of government received a high score, an absent government a low score and a moderate role a middle score. A high total score in this category indicated that this respondent preferred a government that plays a significant role in their life.

Income Redistribution

The following questions were used to determine the Economic Liberals segment: "Do you think the role of government is to redistribute existing wealth or to foster conditions that enable everyone to have a chance to make a higher income?"; "Which of the following is closest to your thinking about the proper role of government in terms of economics?"; and "Which is closest to your view [concerning welfare reform]?"

Responses supportive of income redistribution and a social safety net were given a high score.

Social Conservatism

The following questions were used to determine the Social Conservatives Segment: "Which is closest to your view on homosexuality?"; "What do you think the government's role in protecting the environment should be?"; "Which is closest to your view on affirmative action?"; "Which is closer to your view on abortion?"; and "Which is closest to your view [concerning pornography]?"

Liberal positions received a low score, moderate the middle score, and conservative positions a high score.

Trade

The following questions were used to determine the New Economy Democrats segment: "Which is the closest to your view on what America's trade policy should be?"; "Do you think that in general our involvement in expanded free trade is detrimental to the interests of American workers, helpful to the economic growth of the country, or has elements of both of these?"; and "Which is closest to your view [concerning involvement in reforming Asian economies]?"

Responses considered protectionist or anti-trade received a low score and pro-free trade a high score. ✧

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The Politics of

BY DANIEL H. PINK

American election years have started to resemble Chinese New Years: Each one comes with its own living symbol. Nineteen ninety-four, recall, was the Year of the Angry White Male. Nineteen ninety-six, the Year of the Soccer Mom.

And 2000?

The answer to that political riddle may lie in one subsequent fate of the 1990's last two election-year icons. Like millions of other Americans, legions of angry white males and harried soccer moms have become free agents. They have abandoned traditional jobs and traditional relationships with employers to chart their own course. They are moving from assignment to assignment, project to project, unattached to any single employer, untethered to any large institution. Their ranks include freelancers, independent contractors, temps, self-employed Americans, and home-based entrepreneurs. Some, fed up with office politics and glass ceilings, have leapt. Others, rocked by corporate downsizing, have been pushed. But they've all landed in the same place — the uncharted territory of Free Agent Nation.

The government's statistical apparatus can't tell you how many Americans have become free agents. (No surprise really. A century after the United States ceased being a predominantly agricultural economy, federal bean counters still divide work into two categories: "farm" and "non-farm.") But the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics says that nine million Americans call themselves independent contractors, some 2.8 million Americans go to work each day as temps, roughly 15 million people are self-employed full-time, another two million are self-employed on the side, and nobody's sure how many free agents are operating in the informal, cash economy.

Daniel H. Pink, chief speechwriter for Vice President Al Gore from 1995 until 1997, is writing a book (Warner Books) about the free-agent economy. He can be reached by e-mail (dhpink@ix.netcom.com) or on the web (www.freeagentnation.com).

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Free Agents

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It is perhaps one of the more fundamental economic change of our times. Yet, it is somehow also one of the less heralded. Well beneath the radar of the political and media elite, tens of millions of Americans — by some estimates, a full one-fourth of the nation's workforce — have declared free agency.

If free agency is a reality in America's economic life, then it will fast become a reality in America's political life. In fact, this group's initial show of force may come in the first elections of the next century — marking 2000 as the Year of the Free Agent and recasting the principles and practices of American politics well beyond.

The New Math of the New Economy

Begin with the numbers. The U.S. Senate Small Business Committee estimates that the number of self-employed Americans, a subset of free agents, totals between 22 and 25 million. Working Today, a New York-based advocacy group for independent professionals, puts the free agent figure at about 30 percent of the American workforce. That's the same portion that the Economic Policy Institute says is in "nontraditional work." According to the Bureau of Labor Statistic's July employment report, 30 percent of the workforce amounts to 39.3 million people.

Let's use a far more conservative figure: 25 million people. Although the precise arithmetic of free agency is a bit murky, the electoral math of even that cautious estimate is crystal-clear.

Twenty-five million people means that free agents outnumber all the Americans who work for federal, state, and local governments combined; the population of Free Agent Nation exceeds the population of the entire public sector. And because the U.S. labor force has contained more government workers than manufacturing workers since mid-1991, Free Agent Nation is also larger than the manufacturing sector by nearly seven million people.

But perhaps most significant in political terms is this: The American economy has about 50 percent more free agents than it does members of labor unions. Last year, even amid a booming economy and a spirited AFL-CIO organizing effort, union membership dropped — to 16.1 million people. Separate out the 6.7 million public employees, and the figures are even more striking. Last year, fewer than one in ten workers in America's $6.9 trillion private economy belonged to labor unions. Put it more starkly: Today, America Online has more members than all the nation's private sector labor unions combined.

These figures suggest that in terms of sheer numbers, free agents (25 million and growing) are at least as relevant as organized labor (16 million and shrinking). Meanwhile, the union downswing has not loosed a corresponding upswing in favor of big business or corporate America. As Alan Wolfe notes in *One Nation, After All*, his perceptive study of American values in the 1990s, "If middle class Americans can be described as indifferent to unions, they are also increasingly hostile to corporations." Besides, the Fortune 500 today employ a smaller portion of the workforce than at any time in the history of that once august list.

Free agency links Americans who might otherwise not have a common bond — the proprietor of a home-based child care business, the itinerant construction worker, the downsized manager-turned-consultant, the GenX freelance web designer, and the mom who temps part-time. In the course of reporting and writing about this phenomenon, I've interviewed free agents from Harlem to Silicon Valley. It's an economic form that spans class and race, even if the forces that propel people into Free Agent Nation may differ significantly. Free agency is also especially prominent among women — who are generally more likely to experience both dissatisfaction and outright discrimination in the workplace, and who continue to shoulder the heavier load of family responsibilities.

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However, recognizing the existence of free agents is merely the prelude. To win their allegiance, politicians must understand that free agents think and behave differently from any other group they've encountered.

Premises, Premises: The Foundation of a New Political Strategy

In politics, the only things more important than promises are premises. Set the terms of the debate, and you control the debate. An example: Once most people

agreed that the budget deficit was the most pressing national concern, every action or inaction began with that unquestioned assumption. Fierce opponents of federal spending said the deficit meant we could spend nothing. Ardent supporters of federal spending said we could spend just a little. Since they left from the same subway station on the same line, political adversaries arrived at merely different exits of the same stop. Not, as a fiscally responsible Seinfeld might say, that there's anything wrong with it. But the larger lesson is crucial: The way to prevail in the war of ideas is to win the silent and unannounced battle over premises.

Which leads back to free agency. Free agents are reconfiguring many of the standard assumptions of American work and life. It's here that free agency may leave its most lasting imprint. And it's here, in the realm of premises and values, that politicians face their gravest dangers and greatest opportunities. Oblivious pols risk sounding off-key, or even downright hostile, to huge numbers of citizens. Savvy ones creep closer to bagging America's new electoral trophy.

Two examples illustrate the premises point: Loyalty and security, a pair of values being redefined as more Americans migrate away from traditional jobs.

For much of this century, work in America was governed by an unspoken, yet unassailable, social contract: In exchange for security from employers, employees gave loyalty to employers. "Be loyal to the company," William Whyte wrote in *The Organization Man (1956)*, "and the company will be loyal to you." But in the last decade that bargain has crumbled. Few companies promise lifetime employment; fewer still deliver it. Consequently, individuals no longer pledge unflagging fealty in return.

That has prompted weepy eulogies from both the right and the left lamenting the demise of this American value. But in Free Agent Nation, loyalty isn't dead; it's different. When the tides of global competition and new technologies washed away lifetime job security, loyalty didn't disappear in the undertow. Instead, a new kind of loyalty began emerging. It's not the hierarchical loyalty of old, which flowed up to an institution or authority figure — and then back down to the giver. It's

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lateral loyalty, a fierce commitment that bonds together peers, collaborators, and families.

Security, another national premise, has followed a similar pattern. Security once meant attaching oneself to a large institution for most of one's adult life. But even Americans who haven't declared free agency understand that today such a strategy is outdated, if not dangerous. Instead, as the middle class grows more sophisticated about investing, free agents are approaching their work lives in much the same way they approach their financial lives. They are diversifying. Nobody would invest all of her financial capital in IBM. Why should she invest all her human capital in IBM? Free agents are discovering they are more secure with several clients than with one employer.

These recast premises have already offered hints of a political strategy that speaks to free agents. For example, policies that foster lateral loyalty have proved wildly popular. President Clinton's very first legislative triumph, the Family and Medical Leave Act, put the force of the federal government behind the belief that a person's loyalty to family was, in a moment of need, more important than loyalty to an employer. By contrast, politicians who railed against corporate downsizing or who preached "corporate responsibility" did not capture the public imagination. One reason: Their complaints, however well intentioned, were based on an outdated premise about loyalty. They assumed both the existence and beneficence of hierarchical loyalty. They failed to comprehend that this brand of loyalty, and the paternalistic arrangements on which it was based, had largely disappeared — both as a reality and as an aspiration. Their crusade was analogous to a politician proposing the Great Society during the days of yawning budget deficits. A lovely sentiment maybe — but one that was wholly unrealistic and mostly unwanted.

Ditto for security. In 1994 some Clintonites advocated using "security" as the organizing principle for Democratic policies. The idea flopped. Voters understood that this sort of pledge amounted to an empty promise in a world where security had acquired a fundamentally different meaning.

The New Premises

The lesson for political strategists? Abandon appeals based on these outdated premises — and craft a new strategy around their successors, the three animating values of free agency: opportunity, mobility, and community.

Opportunity. In a world of free agency, government's duty is to offer not a false promise of security, but a real shot at opportunity. Its central mission must be to equip all individuals, especially the least well-off, with the tools they need to make their own way. The most important component of this commitment, of course, is education — childhood, college, and professional learning fashioned to the individual rather than standardized by a bureaucracy. Access to technology is also vital — but far less so than broadening access to the information that technology can harvest. For free agents, government can expand opportunity more by

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supplying information than by delivering services. Remember: From Census data to car safety ratings to the reports of the National Weather Service, hundreds of billions of private dollars already hinge on the information (sometimes reliable, sometimes not) that federal agencies produce. Improving the quality of that information and enlarging its scope — for example, lists of the skills most in demand in particular regions, cost comparisons for health insurance, report cards on temp agencies — can help free agents succeed. And it may be advisable to consider how to deal with companies that take the low road and reclassify employees as contractors merely to cut costs. Some of the most effective labor unions have already begun shifting their focus from security to opportunity. For instance, instead of negotiating long-term collective bargaining agreements with a single employer, the theatrical unions help sound and stage technicians find their next assignment, evaluate potential employers, and sharpen their skills. These are the models political strategists should examine.

Mobility. Government's duty is not to re-cement the old dependence, but to help foster a new mobility — to create the conditions that allow individuals to move freely and make their own decisions about their work lives.

This requires calling into question one of the sturdiest assumptions of American life: the idea that benefits like health insurance and pensions ought to be attached to an Industrial Age construct known as a "job." Instead, such benefits should be linked to the individual. People use health care coverage as people, not as jobholders — and since fewer people now are jobholders anyway, that system makes even less sense than before.

There is a hearty pragmatism in Free Agent Nation; the underlying ideology of a policy is far less important than its effectiveness. So free agent voters would be open both to, say, expanding Medicare to cover free agents and to making Medical Savings Accounts a more attractive choice for middle-class families. They would support a pension policy that both strengthened Social Security and created individual accounts. And a workforce policy premised on mobility would include vouchers for training and tax deductions for education on a far greater scale than the Clinton administration has already engineered.

Community. Free Agent Nation may value individual self-reliance, but the place is far from a libertarian free-for-all. Indeed, Tocquevillian intermediate institutions are more crucial to free agents than they were to the Organization Man. Professional and civic associations are growing stronger as people seek the connection they once had at traditional jobs. Free Agent Nation itself is coming together in small clusters — call them F.A.N. Clubs — to offer business advice and emotional support. And with more people working at home, neighborhoods that once were all but abandoned during the day are growing more vibrant. (A political cautionary tale: Last year when a Los Angeles City Council woman tried to force the city's home-based workers to buy business permits, both free agents and their jobholding neighbors rose up to repeal the proposal and effectively end her career.) Free agents have not rejected community; in fact, they seek it more fervently. Government policies that fortify these new communities will work well in Free Agent Nation.

Free agency is reshaping other premises of American work and life, and these subterranean shifts suggest many other reforms in public policy, particularly in the realm of tax policy. To render solutions that matter in people's lives — and to win the political rewards for doing so — leaders must learn the language and internalize the values of free agency. But that's still not enough; any political strategy aimed at this new group of voters, however well crafted, comes with an important caveat.

Caveat Caesar: The Just-in-Time Politics of Free Agent Nation

It is a mistake to think of free agents as a constituency. They play politics by a new set of rules. And these

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rules, which have already begun to take hold, draw their inspiration from a relatively recent innovation in American business.

Over the last fifteen years, American manufacturing has rehabilitated itself, in part, through a practice known as just-in-time manufacturing. Under the previous regimen, factories cranked out items and stored them in warehouses. If companies miscalculated demand, or if the overall economy weakened, they were stuck with huge inventories of unsold goods. Just-in-time manufacturing called for swift production lines and lean inventories. That reduced costs and allowed the type of customization of products well known to anyone who has bought a computer from Gateway, Dell, or a similar outfit.

Free agency is, in effect, a form of just-in-time staffing. Companies hire the person they need for the project at hand — no more, no less. Individuals take on an assignment of finite duration; their obligation is to perform a particular role as expertly as possible and move on to the next one.

The political world — most often a lagging indicator of innovation — is also morphing toward this form. In an era where there are small inventories of party loyalty, effective politicians must fashion coalitions in much the same way that Gateway fashions computers. Call it just-in-time politics.

Just-in-time politics operates differently from the warehouse politics of the old economy. In the past, one of the main tasks of politics was to keep a single coalition intact — in a sense, to establish a more or less stable inventory that could satisfy any political demand that arose. Time and again, the Democrats' New Deal coalition of union members, minorities, and senior citizens passed legislation and won elections. No more. With party affiliation waning and the once exotic split-ticket voter now a common species, the modern challenge is to assemble the available components to satisfy the current political demand, to do it in real time, and to move on to the next task.

President Clinton has proved to be a master of just-in-time politics, though he has never assigned it that name. In the summer of 1993, he passed major deficit reduction with an entirely Democratic coalition. A few months later, he put together a radically different coalition to expand trade with the North American Free Trade Agreement. He raised the minimum wage by assembling one set of political parts and reformed welfare by cobbling together another — all within the same month in 1996.

Most political commentators took the nail-biting finishes of some of those fights as a sign of President Clinton's political weakness. Instead, it was merely evidence of a new kind of politics — and if anything, proof that this President had mastered it. The nay-saying commentary was akin to a securities analyst, who upon learning that Dell carries only eight days worth of inventory, declared such information a sign of the company's weakness rather than what it really is — a new way of doing business.

Free agents understand the just-in-time features of the economy. They will demand a just-in-time politics. If a party attempts to warehouse them, they will resist. For political forces, this means acknowledging that a huge portion of the electorate is permanently and regularly up for grabs. Politicians must earn their support issue by issue, candidate by candidate, election by election. It's possible for a politician who respects free agents' values, understands their premises, speaks their language, and develops approaches that promote opportunity, mobility, and community to begin to harness this political force.

But while it's possible to win free agents' momentary affection, it's probably very difficult to win their undying love. After all, as consumers, they look for the best deal. As workers, they search for the best assignment. And as voters, they are very likely to be in constant search of the best leader — in 2000 and beyond.✧

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The Son and Daughter Also Rises

BY ANDREI CHERNY

Kathleen Kennedy Townsend

Mondale, Cuomo, Ford, Bayh, Kennedy. The names could be the answers to a quiz on "20th Century Political History." But, the politicians who bear these names are very much a part of "Current Events." For the inheritors of those names of Democratic Party titans have also inherited the responsibility of thinking anew about the challenges of a fast-changing world.

Ted Mondale, Andrew Cuomo, Harold Ford, Jr., Evan Bayh and Kathleen Kennedy Townsend. Just as their fathers were before them, they are part of a new generation of leaders defining the Democratic Party for their own time. They still share the compassion and overall goals long associated with their party. But they are among the growing ranks of politicians choosing what can at times be very different means to achieve those ends.

It does an obvious disservice to reduce their work to any single aspect of their careers, but if one connects the dots of Mondale's desire to move beyond interest group politics, Cuomo's drive to make

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Andrei Cherny is Editor of Blueprint: Ideas for a New Century. From 1997 until 1998, he was Senior Speechwriter for Vice President Al Gore.

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Ted Mondale

Andrew Cuomo

government both smaller and better, Ford's bid to build cross-racial coalitions, Bayh's work in replacing the old welfare state, and Townsend's commitment to embrace the entirety of Robert F. Kennedy's legacy, a larger picture emerges: that of a Democratic Party striving to honor its past by living in the present. Without endorsing any of their candidacies, it's fair to say that all five are pointing the way for a rising generation of New Democrats.

The Labors of Mondale: More Than the Sum of The Parts

"Mondale Betrays Labor," blared a 1995 front-page headline of the *Minneapolis Labor Review*. This apostate Mondale was not Walter, the former Vice President and 1984 presidential nominee, but his son, Ted. As a state senator, his efforts to reform Minnesota's worker compensation program had earned him the enmity of the Minnesota AFL-CIO. But he didn't seem to mind all that much. For he had had a political epiphany. His eyes were opened in 1990 during his first state senate campaign, in the Minneapolis suburb of St. Louis Park.

"I entered the race," he says, "with the somewhat parochial view that politics is about what political label you wear and what interest groups you have on your side." But knocking on the doors of his would-be constituents convinced him that old-style interest group politics was no longer the path to victory. Says Mondale, "I ended the race understanding that this kind of politics isn't relevant to regular voters. The people in St. Louis Park . . . care about their jobs, their families, and the future of their children."

At the time this is being written, Mondale, now 41, is locked in an uphill battle for the Democratic Party's nomination for governor. Whatever the outcome, Mondale has clearly shown he is willing to promote policies even if organized interest groups oppose them — policies such as an end to social promotion in schools, a reduction in the number of government

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employees, and a cut-and-invest budget strategy that redirects resources away from special interest spending and toward initiatives benefitting all Minnesotans. As he said in his announcement speech, he is pursuing a politics to "serve people first and not the institutions."

HUD Start: Doing More With Less

Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Andrew Cuomo, the 40-year-old son of former New York Governor Mario Cuomo, is working hard to turn HUD around by proving that it's possible for government to be both smaller and more effective. He has his work cut out for him — and a huge opportunity. For if any one cabinet department represents the problems of bloated bureaucracies, it is probably HUD — an agency long ridden with corruption, one which gave little oversight to crumbling buildings that often served more as crack houses than as adequate public housing. When it comes to remaking the bureaucracy at HUD, a paraphrase of a song about Cuomo's hometown is appropriate: If it can make it there, it'll make it anywhere.

Expanding on the work of his former boss and predecessor, Henry Cisneros, Andrew Cuomo's approach — focused rigorously on results — strikes out the layers of bloat that, especially in the Information Age, inhibit effective action. For example, over the past five years, the number of employees at HUD has been reduced by more than 40 percent; in the same period the Federal Housing Authority's closing costs for a family home have been cut by $1,200 and the processing time for an FHA loan application has been reduced from as much as five weeks to as little as two minutes.

According to David Osborne, co-author of *Reinventing Government*, HUD's management reform plan,"represents one of the most ambitious, fundamental, and exciting reinvention plans in the recent history of the federal government." And it seems to be working. This new vision of government does more with less – and gets better results. During the time of Cuomo's leadership at HUD, for example, the number of Americans who are homeowners has risen to an all-time high.

Child Harold's Pilgrimage: The Road to Cross-Racial Politics

"For Democrats to regain our majority, we can't be disinclined to traveling down new paths," says Rep. Harold Ford, Jr. Winding down his first term in Congress, during which he served as president of the freshman class, the 28-year-old Ford is traveling down some new paths himself. If he is able to find his way, he might help renew hope in America's ability to deal with its increasing racial and ethnic diversity.

In April 1996, one month shy of graduation from law school, Harold Ford Jr. announced his candidacy for the Congressional seat his father, Harold Ford, Sr., had held for 11 terms. From the beginning of that campaign, Junior — as his campaign literature called him — knew that if he was to provide real leadership, he would have to offer a different way of doing things. "You can't inherit it," he said. "You've got to go out and earn it." In his victorious 1996 campaign and since, he has gone

Harold Ford, Jr.

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Evan Bayh

out and tried to do just that by practicing a politics that breaks down barriers of race and rigid thinking.

He has earned respect from all quarters for work to build coalitions that transcend the color line. And he is pursuing a strategy, he says, "not about protecting the status quo or conventional thinking." In his first term, he voted for the balanced budget, was a vocal proponent of fast track trading authority, and strongly criticized the teaching of Ebonics in public schools. And based on his belief that his generation is increasingly comfortable with private investments, he is exploring Social Security reforms to allow more private retirement savings.

Liberalism at Bayh: Replacing the Welfare State

Replacing the old welfare state with a new approach to government has been key to the success of Evan Bayh, son of former Indiana U.S. Senator Birch Bayh. At 42, the younger Bayh is a former two-term Indiana governor and candidate for U.S. Senate who has avoided the pitfalls that have plagued the left and right. Unlike many liberals, he has not blithely defended old programs for their own sake, and unlike many conservatives, he has not blindly cut all forms of government for the sake of cutting.

As governor, Bayh not only refused to raise taxes; he cut them by more than $2 billion while amassing the largest surplus in the state's history. But his popularity among Hoosiers came not just because he cut government, but because he put government back on the side of middle-class values and Main Street interests. He put more cops on the beat, expanded prison capacity, introduced a HOPE Scholarship-type initiative to help the children of the middle-class get a college education, and increased funding for public schools in every single year of his administration.

His reform of his state's welfare system provides a telling example of his approach. As governor, he led the nation and reduced caseloads to levels unseen since the early 1970s. He achieved this not by abandoning those caught in the old system, but by providing programs to help them help themselves. Through personal responsibility contracts, a dramatic increase in the number of available child-care slots, and a doubling in the collection of overdue child support payments, he promoted the value of work over dependency.

Bayh believes the past 30 years have taught America "that opportunity and responsibility are a two-way street" and he adds,"If you just give without expecting something in return, you create perverse incentives that will prevent opportunity instead of expanding it."

To Seek a Newer World: Back to the Future

Robert F. Kennedy understood that lesson long ago. It is true that many lessons can be learned from the world as it is and as it will be. But for Democrats, there are lessons to be learned, as well, in what once was and what we once wanted to be.

Thirty years after his death, Robert Kennedy is embraced by both sides of the political spectrum as few

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figures have been since Abraham Lincoln. Conservatives claim him as the precursor to the policies of Ronald Reagan. Liberals use him as a touchstone for their attacks on the New Democratic policies of the Clinton-Gore administration.

Both extremes miss the point. No one knows this better than RFK's daughter, Maryland's Lt. Governor Kathleen Kennedy Townsend. "I think there is a great deal of debate because his was not a simplistic legacy," says the 47-year-old Townsend. "We have to take account of my father's entire legacy."

In her current office, and throughout her career, Townsend has sought to live up to the full implications of that legacy. She promotes her father's brand of muscular progressivism, emulating his "focus on what citizens can do and not just on spending money. He always asked, 'Is this working? Is this consistent with our values?'"

She has concentrated on initiatives that promote basic American values that too many Democrats ignored for too long. As Lieutenant Governor, she has developed the HotSpot Communities Initiative, which targets government resources on the three percent of Maryland communities that account for 50 percent of the state's crime. She has created the nation's first state-level Character Education Office to ensure that public schools instruct children in ethics. And under her leadership, Maryland became the first and only state with a mandatory student service program to promote civic involvement. The principles she says unite these initiatives suggest she is steering away from allowing any orthodox ideology to dominate her thinking. As she says: "Government can work. It cannot work alone. And human beings are capable of greatness."

In many ways, Robert Kennedy was a transitional figure. The growth that he showed over his all too brief life was not just the one described by his biographers — that of the leader who went from an arrogant young man working for Joseph McCarthy to a shaggy-haired prophet marching with Cesar Chavez, from sunning himself with the rich to comforting the poor. His growth was also that of the man who began to question the comfortable assumptions of his time. He went from a leader who criticized the Great Society for not spending enough to someone who looked around and realized that the easy answers were leading us in the wrong direction.

Townsend often refers to the following words of her father, words with resonance in today's polarized debates. "What we need is a better liberalism and a better conservatism," Robert Kennedy said in 1968. "We need a liberalism in its wish to do good, that yet knows the answer to all problems is not spending money. Money can't buy dignity, self-respect, or fellow-feeling between citizens. We need a conservatism, in its wish to preserve the enduring values of the American society, that yet recognizes the urgent need to bring opportunity to all citizens, that is willing to take action to meet the needs of the future. What the new politics is, in the last analysis, is a reaffirmation of the best within the great political traditions of our nation: compassion for those who suffer, determination to right the wrongs in our nation, and a willingness to think and act anew, free from old concepts and false illusions."

As the train carrying Robert Kennedy's body rumbled toward his burial in Washington in 1968, the tracks were lined with Americans paying their last respects. They came to express their sadness for a family that had already suffered so much. They came to ask what might have been. They came because in the midst of the most divisive decade since the Civil War, Robert Kennedy had seemed able to unite Americans across lines of age and color.

But perhaps they came for another reason, as well. Perhaps they came because Robert Kennedy answered their hunger for leaders who would challenge the status quo and offer solutions fit for the future. If so, it's a hunger Americans still have today. A hunger that five children of men who led the Democratic Party just might be able to satisfy. ✧

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BUILDING THE NEXT DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY

BY AL FROM AND WILL MARSHALL

The New Deal political era, characterized by Democratic Party dominance, has long been over. But the political order of the new era has yet to be set. The next dominant party — if there is one — has yet to be determined.

We are convinced that the Democrats can be that majority party again. The key to building that new majority is shaping a progressive politics in tune with the new realities of Information Age politics explored in this issue.

To do that, Democrats must do more than galvanize higher turnout among downscale voters or create a coalition of cause-oriented activists. While retaining its base voters, Democrats must speak to the values and aspirations of the rising forces that will dominate our society over the next 25 years: Baby boomers and GenX'ers who are skeptical of big institutions, including government; wired workers who rely more on mind than muscle; well-educated members of a new Learning Class who comprise an increasingly upscale electorate; and Latino and Asian immigrants who are changing the face of American society even as they assimilate into the mainstream.

President Clinton and Vice President Gore have advanced that process with their New Democrat agenda. But the party's decline at the congressional, state, and local levels has yet to be reversed. The party — from top to bottom — needs to complete the work of political modernization, challenging outdated assumptions, embracing new solutions, and demonstrating sufficient independence from interest groups to govern in the broader public interest.

To that end, we propose 10 commandments for 21st century politics. They are not, of course, engraved on stone tablets, but they just might help Democrats find the Promised Land of a new national majority.

Al From is president of the Democratic Leadership Council; Will Marshall is president of the Progressive Policy Institute

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Rule One: Remember the fundamentals

To be trusted to lead, Democrats must always make sure to first concentrate on the fundamentals. That is why President Clinton and Vice President Gore fought to restore fiscal discipline through a balanced budget, to reinvent a sclerotic federal establishment, to end welfare entitlements that flouted most Americans' belief in responsibility, and to prevent crime with more police on the beat.

Confronting these central issues has helped the party shed old liabilities while shifting the terrain of political debate to ground more favorable to Democrats. Seizing the political center has a dual benefit: It reassures an electorate more receptive to progressive ideas on education, healthcare, the environment and other issues, and it forces Republicans farther toward the fringe.

Rule Two: Embrace the New Economy

No amount of hiding in the sand will change this basic fact: The New Economy is here to stay. Globalization and increasing technological sophistication will not be reversed. For Democrats the choice is clear: to offer paeans to a bygone time or to be the party that makes this New Economy work for all Americans willing to do their part.

Fanning economic fear and pessimism won't do. Instead, Democrats must have a credible and optimistic strategy to help working Americans enter the winners' circle as we move from the industrial to the information economy. That means uniting behind efforts to stimulate greater public and private investment in developing all workers' skills; reforming public policies to give workers control over key sources of economic security such as pensions and health insurance; and creating incentives for workers to build wealth through capital ownership. Democrats succeed when they are the party of growth and opportunity. To do so in the next century, it is imperative to see the world as it is, not as it used to be.

Rule Three: Replace class warfare with a politics of common aspiration

The old class warfare doesn't work. Outdated appeals to class grievance and attacks on corporate perfidy only alienate new constituencies and ring increasingly hollow to the modern workforce. To win in the next century, Democrats must link the aspirations of working Americans who most fear the New Economy to those of wired workers and the burgeoning Learning Class who are prospering in it. In 1996, President Clinton set the example by winning every category of voter up to $75,000, thereby winning the election — while Congressional Democrats won every category up to $30,000, thereby remaining a minority.

Wired workers have so far shown little interest in demonizing the companies on whose competitive success their own economic fortunes depend. Moreover, in a hotly competitive global economy, neither U.S. workers nor bosses can afford to indulge in adversarial habits. Only teamwork, innovation, and flexibility can keep them ahead of the competition and support high wages and living standards. Democrats must show they uphold those interests.

Rule Four: Speak to common values, not narrow interests

As America grows more diverse, majorities cannot be built the old way — piling new interest groups atop the old coalition by offering new public entitlements. Not only would such a course resurrect the party's identification with wasteful government, it would create a weak coalition bound together not by a common creed but by separate appetites for public spoils.

To emulate President Clinton's national success, Democrats must knit together a highly diverse set of legislative districts which on their own, are ever more homogenous because of gerrymandering. Districts that are heavily African American, for example, or tilted to

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"THE COMING DECADES WILL BRING A NEW DIVERSITY WITHIN DIVERSITY."

labor must be woven together with districts comprised of white suburbanites or wired workers. The only way to achieve this is to build a politics grounded in crosscutting values and ideas.

Rule Five: Speak to voters directly rather than through intermediaries

Interest group politics — appeals to constituency groups rather than directly to voters — worked for the Democratic Party when most voters got their political information through large mediating organizations that could turn out large blocks of voters (urban machines, and labor unions, for example). Today, increasingly educated voters arrive at their political judgments on their own, based on information available from a variety of sources. And, interest groups have an increasingly hard time getting their own followers to follow, as the teachers' union chiefs learned recently when rank-and-file members rejected their plans to merge.

Rather than speaking primarily to and through constituency groups, Democrats must learn to appeal directly to people as citizens rather than as beneficiaries of this program or that. In the Information Age, a promise made to one group will instantaneously be known to everyone, making narrow appeals to disparate interests more likely to divide than to unite a political coalition.

Rule Six: Replace identity group politics with national identity politics

America's increasing ethnic and racial diversity gives Democrats both an opportunity and a challenge. Wedge politics — a kind of white identity politics principally practiced, to cynical perfection, by the GOP — is likely to boomerang in a nation of multiple, growing minorities. Having thoroughly alienated African Americans, the nativist and exclusive themes sounded by some prominent Republicans are driving Hispanic Americans out as well. In a multiethnic democracy, prospects are bleak for an all-white party.

As this decade began, California seemed to be becoming increasingly Republican. Yet the combination of the insistence by Republicans on playing crass wedge politics and the growth of wired workers has given Golden State Democrats a new lease on life. Similarly, the combination of exploding ethnic diversity and growing numbers of wired workers in Texas and Florida should continue to give Democrats openings in two key states that recently have been considered GOP bastions.

But America's growing diversity should not be a signal to Democrats that identity politics — their brand of race-based politics — will be any more effective. The ability of more and more minority Americans to enter the middle class will mean that they will become increasingly concerned with a host of political issues that have less and less relation to the color of their skin. Moreover, as the coming decades will bring a new diversity within diversity, the idea of minorities as a homogenous community with shared principles will be called into further question. Already we see the different outlooks of Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Cuban Americans — all grouped under a single category as Hispanic.

To build a broad and diverse coalition, Democrats should work overtime to place the primacy of our common national identity over separatist claims based on race, ethnicity or gender. That common identity, that common civic culture, consists of the democratic values and institutions we share. It rests on the ideals on which our nation was founded, the sturdy framework that has enabled us to convert our diversity into a source of strength rather than a source of discord and weakness.

Rule Seven: Replace urban machines with metro-wide coalitions

For decades, a key element of the Democrats' strategy has been to steer more federal aid to the cities in order to "feed the base." That is, urban machines — typically controlled, in succession, by various ethnic and later racial

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"PRESIDENT CLINTON WON RE-ELECTION LARGELY BECAUSE OF SUBURBAN VOTERS"

groups — needed oiling if they were expected to turn out loyal Democratic voters. But this approach proved self-defeating as top-down urban policies often made matters worse — federal housing policy is a conspicuous example — and thus contributed to middle class flight by all races and ethnic groups. The post-war exodus from cities to the suburbs has sharply reduced the cities' share of the statewide vote.

To build a new majority, Democrats must win in the suburbs. In 1996, President Clinton won re-election largely because of inroads made among suburban voters. But Democrats cannot win with the suburbs alone. The cities contain voters who are important to Democratic majorities — and whose concerns deserve serious attention from a nation interested in lifting all its citizens.

To bring these interests together, Democrats must forge metropolitan coalitions of both city and suburban voters. Without political support in the suburbs, Democrats won't be able to help the cities. But without a concern for the cities, suburban votes won't be enough to form a Democratic majority — and the Democrats won't be living up to their traditional principles.

The key is to recognize that urban and suburban voters want essentially the same things: economic prosperity, safe streets, and good schools. At the state and local level, Democrats must see that the key is a bottom-up empowerment agenda that reconnects cities to markets, creates growth boundaries to limit sprawl, and works through community institutions not public bureaucracies.

Rule Eight: Replace top-down bureaucracies with an enabling government

In declaring the era of big government over, President Clinton freed Democrats to rethink the means by which a progressive government responds to citizens' needs. Instead of defending centralized programs with roots in the social conditions of the 1930s and 1960s, progressives should be leading the charge to invent a modern model for governing that equips people and communities with the tools they need to solve their own problems. In the 21st century, Democrats don't have to give up on activist government, but they do have to realize it must take a new shape.

The Skeptical Generations do not reject government; they object to inflexible bureaucracies that move too slowly, limit choices, and resist sensible innovations in areas such as welfare, education and criminal justice. That is why, for example, charter schools — a new form of public school not controlled and run by the central school bureaucracies — are spreading. It is why New Democrats have proposed converting federal training and social programs into vouchers, so that citizens can make choices formerly delegated to so-called experts. And it is why many Democrats are talking about modernizing Social Security to include individual savings accounts.

The model should also break down the rigid separation of government and society and create a new hybrid of public-civic activism. The left-right debate posits a choice between government and the market, overlooking the crucial third sector of civic institutions. For too long, progressives have assumed that "public" and "government" are synonymous. But civil society is also a public realm. It is important to reject the conservatives' false choice between government and the voluntary sector. But it is also critical to break down bureaucratic monopolies and enlist community leaders and institutions in the delivery of key public services.

Rule Nine: Protect children, not programs

By the 1980s, a public backlash against high taxes and excessive government spending and regulation had undermined the force of traditional Democratic appeals to social justice. A new approach — focused on "protecting children" — became a catchall to build support for liberal programs. Who could be against helping kids, the thinking went.

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This theme has played shrewdly on the anxieties of baby boomers, a critical mass of voters who are now raising children. They often see themselves as contending with an outside world crowded with harmful influences: tobacco and drugs, all-pervasive media saturated with sex and violence, disorderly schools, and dangerous public places. They understand that families, not government, raise children, but they do not want to face that responsibility alone: They rightly want the force of public policies on their side.

However, Democrats should guard against letting the formula of "protecting kids" become an all-purpose rationale for activist government. Eventually, promiscuous use of this tactic will only discredit legitimate attempts to help our children. And it will make even less sense as the number of families with minor children at home falls to an all-time low early in the next century.

As the boomers move toward retirement, empty nesters will come to rival parents with children as a dominant force in politics. This means that Democrats will have to develop overarching themes that unite the interests of families with children and those without them. Above all, Democrats must not allow a new divide to open between "haves and have nots" — in this case families, many of them younger immigrants, who have minor children and those families, older and mainly white, who do not have them. It is a moral imperative to continue to show the electorate that American children — whether they live under our roof or not — are our most basic investment in the nation's future.

Rule Ten: Replace partisanship with problem solving

Since only about 20 percent of Americans describe themselves as liberal, the new majority needs to win most moderates and even a substantial percentage of conservatives. In the 1996 elections, for instance, 39 percent of the voters identified themselves as Democrats, 35 percent as Republicans and 26 percent as Independents. Democrats therefore will need to capture about half the Independents to win even a bare majority.

This basic electoral math casts doubt on an all too typical Washington tactic of polarizing issues along starkly partisan lines. The point of such tactics is not to solve problems but to score ideological points and stimulate campaign contributions from special interests. Such polarization inhibits reasonable compromises and ensures political paralysis. No wonder the public feels disengaged from Washington debates that put partisan posturing over progress.

Yet President Clinton's ability to sustain support throughout much of his presidency — despite the miasma of scandals and investigations that hangs over Washington — shows that Americans are ready to reward pragmatic problem-solving over reflexive partisanship. It's telling that critics have often accused Clinton of stealing Republican ideas. In fact, he has understood that Democrats can only succeed by solving America's major problems as the public defines them, not as party ideologies define them.

These, then, are 10 commandments to help build the foundation of a new progressive majority. In a century as hopeful and turbulent as the next one promises to be, America more than ever needs a creative and innovative Democratic Party. When Americans step into the election booth, they vote not for a political party, but for a better future. If Democrats are to regain majority status, they must convince America that they will be able to build that future. ✧

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"In an age of change, the status quo will not hold. In a time of transformation, new thinking must guide our path. In a new century, our politics must be more than a monument to the past; it must be a movement for the future."

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